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THE "NEW PROTECTIONISM" AND THE
AMERICAN COMMON MARKET
Norman R. Williams* & Brannon P. Denningt
For nearly two centuries, the U.S. Constitution through the dormant
Commerce Clause has protected the American common market from protec-
tionist commercial state regulations and taxes. During the past two terms,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court created a new exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause for protectionist state and local taxes and regulations that
favor public rather than private entities. In this Article, we describe this
"New Protectionism" and argue that the Court's embrace of it is profoundly
misguided. As we document, there is no material difference, economically or
constitutionally, between public protectionism and private protectionism. As
illustrated by the variety of ways in which government and private enterprise
interact, there is no coherent distinction between public and private activi-
ties, and ensuing efforts to draw such a line will only serve to embroil the
courts in tasks for which it is ill suited. Worse, this new exception only
encourages state and local governments to engage in protectionism in a vari-
ety of contexts, such as education and local economic development, in which
the dangers to national economic union are paramount. Coupled with the
Court's recently declared unwillingness to subject nondiscriminatory regula-
tions and taxes to minimal judicial scrutiny, this endorsement of public pro-
tectionism threatens to emasculate the constitutional protections for the
American common market and should therefore be rethought by the Court or
legislatively superseded by Congress.
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INTRODUCTION
For close to two centuries, the United States Supreme Court has
actively sought to protect interstate trade from undue disruption by
state or local governments. Pursuant to the so-called "dormant Com-
merce Clause," the Court has reviewed state and local legislation to
ensure that local measures do not unreasonably disrupt the American
common market.1 Although the Court has deployed different doctri-
nal formulas over the years to distinguish between legitimate state
commercial regulations and illegitimate measures that unduly inter-
fere with interstate trade,2 one constant has been a strict prohibition
on protectionist measures that seek to insulate in-state economic activ-
ity from out-of-state competition. Beginning as early as the middle of
1 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
2 See Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth ofDual Federalism, 54
UCLA L. REv. 1847, 1929-30 (2007).
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the nineteenth century, the Court actively rooted out and invalidated
state laws that sought to discourage the sale of out-of-state goods or
services so as to favor local economic interests.3 Since then, numer-
ous "discriminatory" measures have been struck down by the Court.4
Indeed, as others have noted, this antipathy to local protectionism has
been a hallmark of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.5
Change, however, is afoot. In the past two years, the Court has
signaled that some state or local protectionism is constitutionally per-
missible. In 2007, in United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority,6 the Court upheld county ordinances that
required all solid waste be processed at a local, municipally owned
facility, thereby displacing out-of-state private competition. Mean-
while, in the spring of 2008, in Department of Revenue v. Davis,7 the
Court upheld a nakedly protectionist tariff on out-of-state municipal
bonds, holding that states could tax the interest on municipal bonds
issued by other states (or their political subdivisions) even when they
exempt the interest on their own bonds.8 In defending the constitu-
3 See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 281 (1876) (invalidating discriminatory
state law and decrying the "evils of discriminating State legislation, favorable to the
interests of one State and injurious to the interests of other states"); see also Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (declaring that
such "iniquitous laws and impolitic measures" were "destructive to the harmony of the
States" and were therefore unconstitutional).
4 See Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50
WM. & MARY L. REv. 417, 428-48 (discussing doctrinal evolution of the dormant Com-
merce Clause); see also Williams, supra note 2, at 1865-66 & nn.74, 80 (citing cases
pertaining to "state" discriminatory measures).
5 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1206-20 (1986).
6 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
7 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
8 For convenience sake, we refer to all bonds issued either by state or local gov-
ernments, or their political subdivisions, as municipal bonds. For additional com-
mentary on United Haulers and Davis, see Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Might
Take Us: The Future of the State-Self-Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause
Rule, 95 IOWA L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Coenen, United Haulers],
available at http://works.bepress.com/dancoenen/22; Walter Hellerstein & Eugene
W. Harper, Jr., Discriminatory State Taxation of "Private Activity Bond" Income After Davis,
123 TAX NOTES 447 (2009); Daniel R. Ray, Cash, Trash, and Tradition: A New Dormant
Commerce Clause Exception Emerges from United Haulers and Davis, 61 TAx LAW. 1021
(2008); Dan T. Coenen, The Supreme Court's Municipal Bond Decision and the Market-
Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause (2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://works.bepress.com/dancoenen/21/ [hereinafter Coenen, The
Supreme Court's Municipal Bond Decision]; Edward A. Zelinsky, The False Modesty of
Department of Revenue v. Davis: Disrupting the Dormant Commerce Clause Through the
Traditional Public Function Doctrine (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns
2oog]1 249
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tionality of both measures, the Court pointed to the fact that the pro-
tected activities were governmental rather than private in nature.9
In our view, these decisions create a new exception to the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, one for protectionist state and local taxes
and regulations that favor public rather than private entities. Under
the Court's new approach, which we call the "New Protectionism,"
state and local governments may not favor local private businesses as
such, but they may adopt taxes and regulations that protect state or
local governmental operations from out-of-state competition, whether
public or private.10 In short, in the Court's view, public protectionism
is not constitutionally proscribed.
As one might expect, it is difficult normatively to reconcile the
New Protectionism with the Court's longstanding condemnation of
protectionism generally. In both United Haulers and Davis, the Court
ruled that measures that protect governmental operations from out-
of-state competition are not discriminatory and, therefore, are exempt
from the rigorous judicial review reserved for discriminatory mea-
sures.1 To the same end, in Davis, a plurality ofJustices declared that
public protectionism fits within the "market-participant" exception to
the dormant Commerce Clause, which exempts state or local govern-
ments from constitutional review when acting as "market participants"
rather than "market regulators." 12 The net effect of these doctrinal
moves is to exempt public protectionism from the stringent judicial
scrutiny reserved for discriminatory measures and to subject it instead
to the lenient review applied to nondiscriminatory measures.' 3 Mean-
while, in Davis, the Court refused to apply even that minimal level of
scrutiny on the ground that such review was inappropriate for the
Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 255, Mar. 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1352687.
9 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1815.
10 See id. at 1815-17.
11 Discriminatory measures are "'virtually per se'" invalid, Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (quoting City of Phila. v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)),
and can be upheld only when the state demonstrates that the law "'serves a legitimate
local purpose' and that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondis-
criminatory means." Id. at 138 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336
(1979)).
12 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811-14.
13 In United Haulers, the Court subjected the county flow-control ordinances to
the so-called "Pike balancing test" from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Interestingly, however, in Davis, the Court refused to apply Pike because, as the Court
explained, the benefits and costs of Kentucky's municipal bond taxation scheme
could not be measured and evaluated by courts in a principled or coherent fashion.
See Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1817-19.
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judicial branch to perform, thereby leaving public protectionism
exempt from all Commerce Clause review.14
In our view, the Court's embrace of the New Protectionism is pro-
foundly misguided. Despite its best efforts, the Court has failed to
provide a theoretically sound, normatively attractive justification for
treating public protectionism as materially different from private pro-
tectionism, which the Court continues to condemn in earnest terms.
Its conclusory designation of such protectionist measures as nondis-
criminatory blinks reality. Meanwhile, the Davis plurality's capacious
but bizarre reinterpretation of the market-participant exception col-
lapses the fundamental distinction upon which that exception rests-
namely, that there is a constitutionally significant difference between
state taxes and regulations on the one hand and state market transac-
tions on the other hand. Finally in this regard, although the Court
has repeatedly made clear that nondiscriminatory regulations and
taxes are subject to dormant Commerce Clause review,15 the Court's
refusal in Davis to perform even that minimal level of review unjustifi-
ably leaves public protectionism exempt from all forms of judicial
review, strict or lenient, under the Commerce Clause.
Such analytical shortcomings and the confusion they sow are bad
enough, but the implications for interstate commerce posed by the
Court's endorsement of public protectionism are truly breathtaking.
The Court's embrace of taxes and regulations that favor public enti-
ties only encourages state and local governments to engage in more
public protectionism. Worse, because private and public enterprises
often commingle and cooperate16-a fact that, critically, the Court
has failed to appreciate-the public-entities exception created by the
Court opens the door to governmental efforts to protect private enter-
prises from out-of-state competition through cleverly constructed
public-private partnerships. Coupled with the plurality's incompre-
hensibly broad and muddled conception of the market-participant
exception, this endorsement of public protectionism threatens to
emasculate the constitutional protections for the American common
market. In other words, the logic underlying the Court's New Protec-
tionism is not easily cabined, and could-with just a little push-lead
to the elimination of the dormant Commerce Clause itself.
14 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810.
15 Pike, 397 U.S. at 145-46.
16 For cases that provide an example of "cooperation," see BORIS 1. BITTKER &
BRANNON P. DENNING, BiTTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM-
MERCE 187 n.181.2 (2009 Cum. Supp.).
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Recent developments only bolster these concerns. Parochial
political pressures often induce lawmakers to adopt protectionist mea-
sures even in the best of times. 17 Economic crises, such as the current
one, only add further urgency to calls to undertake protectionist
actions to create and preserve local jobs.18 One prominent protec-
tionist mechanism used by state and local governments is economic
development or so-called "private activity" bonds: a state issues bonds
whose proceeds are given to local companies to underwrite local eco-
nomic development. Despite the bond's nominal status as a govern-
ment bond, the principal and interest on such bonds are typically
repaid by the private companies that received the bond proceeds. 9
Nevertheless, because the bonds are technically issued by the state
government, the interest earned on such bonds is exempt from fed-
eral income taxation and, because of Davis, exempt from taxation by
the state that issued them (but not other states).20 This favorable tax
treatment significantly reduces the private companies' cost of borrow-
ing, and, coupled with the protectionist tax treatment upheld as con-
stitutional by the Court in Davis, provides local private enterprises
with a substantial economic edge over their out-of-state competitors.
To be sure, because of the potential for abuse, federal law has histori-
cally limited the scope of such financing,21 but the current economic
crisis has led Congress to consider reducing those limitations,
allowing states to engage in ever greater protection of private local
industry.22 In Part I, we briefly describe the modern dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine and give a brief account of the Court's deci-
sions in United Haulers and Davis that create this new exception for
the New Protectionism. In Part 1I, we identify and analyze the short-
comings of the Court's efforts to reconcile public protectionism with
its continuing condemnation of private protectionism. Specifically,
we scrutinize and reject the Court's creation of a public-entities excep-
17 See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 346-49 (1992) (invali-
dating protectionist measure adopted for environmental, not economic, reasons).
18 Cf David Stevenson, The Return of Protectionism, MONEYWEEK, Jan. 16, 2009,
http://www.moneyweek.com/news-and-charts/economics/the-return-of-protection-
ism-14462.aspx (explaining that, given the global economic slowdown, "[i]ndustries
worldwide are asking their governments for protection from imports," with American
companies leading the way).
19 SeeJames R. Ramsey & Merl Hackbart, State and Local Debt Policy and Manage-
ment, in HANDBOOK OF DEBT MANAGEMENT 255, 261 (Gerald J. Miller ed., 1996).
20 26 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
21 See id. § 141.
22 See H.R. 425, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 537, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Peter
Schroeder & Audrey Dutton, House Eyes Muni, Tax Cut Bills, BOND BUYER, Jan. 16,
2009, at 19 (discussing the muni provisions in the stimulus package).
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tion to the prohibition on discriminatory taxes and regulations. Part
III explores how this doctrinal innovation will deleteriously impact
state and local regulation and taxation of interstate commerce and
the judicial review thereof in the future.
In Part IV, we discuss the efforts of a plurality of the Court to
expand the market-participant doctrine sufficiently to cover the deci-
sion in Davis. If ultimately adopted by the Court, we argue, the mar-
ket-participant doctrine will no longer be an exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause, but will swallow that doctrine completely.
In Part V, we assess the Court's shift toward the position that nondis-
criminatory state and local regulations are entirely immune from judi-
cial scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause no matter how
burdensome they are. This would represent a break with over a cen-
tury's worth of precedent and effectively exempt public protectionism
from all judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. For that rea-
son, we conclude by calling upon the Court to reassess (and ultimately
reverse) its embrace of the "New Protectionism." Failing that, we urge
Congress to use its constitutional authority with respect to interstate
commerce to prohibit states and local governments from engaging in
this constitutionally nefarious behavior.
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, UNITED HAULERS, AND DAVIS
Before making the argument that the Court's recent dormant
Commerce Clause cases endorse a New Protectionism, we need to
clear away some brush. First, we offer a thumbnail sketch of the
pre- United Haulers doctrine. Then, we offer a brief summary of the
Court's decisions in United Haulers and Davis.2 3 In Part II, we will
draw specific attention to those aspects of Davis and United Haulers
that depart dramatically from the case law as understood prior to the
cases, while Part III discusses the implications of the public-entities
exception for the dormant Commerce Clause generally.
A. The Pre-United Haulers Dormant Commerce Clause:
A Doctrinal Summary
Prior to the Court's recent cases, the rules governing the dor-
mant Commerce Clause were thought to be settled. 24 There was a
two-tiered standard of review. For state or local laws that were "dis-
criminatory"-facially, purposefully, or effectively-a form of strict
23 The summaries of United Haulers and Davis draw freely on BrIrKER & DENNING,
supra note 16.
24 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
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scrutiny applied, requiring the government to demonstrate (1) a legit-
imate (i.e., nonprotectionist) purpose and (2) that it lacked less dis-
criminatory means to effectuate that interest.25 We'll call this the
"antidiscrimination principle." Other laws alleged to burden inter-
state commerce were subject to the so-called "Pike balancing test,"
whose canonical formulation required the challenger to demonstrate
that the burden on interstate commerce "is clearly excessive in rela-
tion to the putative local benefits."26
There were two primary exceptions to the antidiscrimination
principle. First, it (and the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine gen-
erally) was understood to be a default rule that Congress could, by
affirmative legislation, alter.27 The second exception, the market-par-
ticipant doctrine, permitted states acting as market "participants" as
opposed to market "regulators" to favor in-state interests over those
from out-of-state so long as the state did not attempt to impose restric-
tions "downstream" from the market in which it was participating.2 8
In addition to this last limit, the Court also consistently rejected
attempts to invoke the market-participant doctrine to sustain discrimi-
natory tax credits or tax exemptions, holding that the use of the tax-
ing power was a "primeval governmental activity"29 unavailable to
private market participants. 30 United Haulers and Davis have greatly
unsettled the "black-letter" law of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine.
25 See id.
26 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
27 See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427-40 (1946) (uphold-
ing both the McCarran-Ferguson Act's delegation to states of power to regulate the
insurance business and a discriminatory state law passed in its wake). But see Norman
R. Williams, Why Congress Cannot "Overrule" the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 153 (2005) (criticizing this exception).
28 See generally Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395, 396-405 (1989) (describing the devel-
opment of the market-participant doctrine).
29 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988).
30 See generally Coenen, supra note 28, at 409 (providing a history and critique of
the market-participant doctrine); Norman R. Williams, Taking Care of Ourselves: State
Citizenship, the Market, and the State, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 493-99 (2008) (offering a
framework to reconcile competing demands of interstate equality and state auton-
omy). Though the Court has never explicitly so held, it is generally assumed that
states may subsidize in-state businesses in a discriminatory manner. See Dan T.
Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 978
(1998). For more on the market-participant doctrine and Davis, see discussion infra
Part IV.
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B. United Haulers
The stage for United Haulers was set in 1994, when the Court
decided C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,3' in which it invali-
dated a local "forced use" law requiring all garbage haulers in a New
York town to process their garbage at a private processing facility. 2
The effect of the law was to prohibit the export of garbage for process-
ing anywhere outside the town. Applying the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple described above, the Court had little trouble striking down the
Clarkstown ordinance.33
In what would become the majority position in United Haulers,
Justice Souter dissented in Carbone, arguing that the majority ignored
the essentially public nature of the processing plant-Clarkstown had
agreed to purchase the plant for a nominal sum after five years, first
guaranteeing the company a sufficient volume of trash to recoup its
initial capital investment in the plant 3 4-and that the de facto munici-
pal ownership should have immunized the ordinance from
invalidation.35
For over a decade after Carbone, scholars criticized the Court's
opinion3 6 and lower court judges attempted to deal with the numer-
ous challenges that arose in its wake.3 7 A split developed over whether
Carbone applied to ordinances requiring disposal at publicly owned, as
opposed to private, sites.38 Questions also arose regarding the appli-
cability of the market-participant exception to the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine.3 9
31 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
32 See id. at 392-95.
33 See id.
34 Id. at 387.
35 See id. at 410-11 (Souter, J., dissenting).
36 See, e.g., Stanley E. Cox, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Court Confusion About the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, 50 OIA. L. REV. 155, 185-89 (1997); Christine A. Klein, The
Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARv. ENVrL. L. REV. 1, 47-52 (2003); Bradford C.
Mank, Are Public Facilities Different from Private Ones?: Adopting a New Standard of Review
for the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 SMU L. REv. 157, 176-78 (2007); Paula C. Murray
& David B. Spence, Fair Weather Federalism and America's Waste Disposal Crisis, 27 HARV.
ENvrL. L. REv. 71, 72, 89-91 (2003).
37 For citations to cases decided after Carbone, see BIrrKER & DENNING, supra note
16, at 187 n.181.2.
38 Compare United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
438 F.3d 150, 161-63 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding ordinance requiring disposal at
municipal authority-owned waste disposal site), with Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v.
Daviess County, 434 F.3d 898, 910-12 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that similar ordinance
violated the dormant Commerce Clause).
39 See, e.g., BIrrKER & DENNING, supra note 16, at 222-25 (citing cases).
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The Court's decision in United Haulers clarified one of these ques-
tions. Oneida and Herkimer Counties banded together to solve a col-
lective solid waste disposal problem by seeking state permission to
create a solid waste disposal authority and having the counties enter
into a management agreement for the disposal of solid waste. 40 The
Authority "agreed to purchase and develop facilities for the process-
ing and disposal of solid waste and recyclables generated in the Coun-
ties." 41 It also collected tipping fees to cover the costs of operating
such facilities.4 2 The fees charged, the Court explained, "significantly
exceeded those charged for waste removal on the open market," but
permitted the Authority to provide services like recycling and com-
posting not otherwise available.43 The Authority also enacted a flow-
control ordinance, requiring all solid waste generated within the
counties to be processed at the Authority's processing site.4 4
Private haulers sued, citing Carbone for the proposition that all
flow-control ordinances requiring local processing of solid waste were
discriminatory and subject to strict scrutiny. The Court disagreed, dis-
tinguishing Carbone because the Oneida and Herkimer waste manage-
ment authority's processing station was publicly owned. 4 5
The Court, per Chief Justice Roberts, first held that the constitu-
tional significance of private versus public ownership was not settled
by Carbone.4 6 The Court rejected the haulers' (and Justice Alito's)
arguments that the Carbone majority didn't respond to Justice Souter's
arguments about the nominal private ownership of the Clarkstown
facility, because the majority thought that it was irrelevant to any dor-
mant Commerce Clause analysis. 47 On the contrary, the Court wrote
that "[i]f the Court were extending this line of local processing cases
to cover discrimination in favor of local government, one would
expect it to have said sO."48
The Court then cited "[c]ompelling reasons" for its holding that
flow-control ordinances, like the Authority's, "do not discriminate
against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce
40 See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 334-36 (2007).
41 Id. at 335-36.
42 Id. at 335.
43 Id. The evidence was that "without the flow control laws and the associated
$86-per-ton tipping fees, they could dispose of solid waste at out-of-state facilities for
between $37 and $55 per ton, including transportation." Id. at 337.
44 Id. at 334.
45 See id. at 339-42.
46 See id. at 339-40.
47 See id.; see also id. at 359 (Alito,J., dissenting) (raising this argument).
48 Id. at 340 (majority opinion).
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Clause."49 First, the Court noted that " [s] tates and municipalities are
not private businesses-far from it. Unlike private enterprise, govern-
ment is vested with the responsibility of protecting the health, safety,
and welfare of its citizens."50 Thus, "it does not make sense to regard
laws favoring local government and laws favoring private industry with
equal skepticism" because the former are not likely to be motivated by
"'simple economic protectionism.' "51 The Court's opinion noted that
the motive here was not to enrich local business, but rather to force
residents to internalize the cost of the waste they generated. 52 State
and local governments ought to be able to act without "federal
courts . . . decid[ing] what activities are appropriate for [them] to
undertake, and what activities must be the province of private market
competition."5 3
Second, the majority wrote that the Court "should be particularly
hesitant to interfere with the Counties' efforts under the guise of the
Commerce Clause" because waste disposal has been traditionally han-
dled by local governments. 54 Finally, the Justices argued that the need
for judicial intervention here is reduced because of the availability of
political safeguards: "Here, the citizens and businesses of the Counties
bear the costs of the ordinances. There is no reason to step in and
hand local businesses a victory they could not obtain through the
political process."55
In its rather desultory analysis under Pike balancing, the Court
concluded that even assuming that there was a burden on interstate
commerce, it did not "clearly exce [ed]" the health and environmental
benefits that it produced for the counties' citizens.56
In his dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy,
Justice Alito argued that the case was indistinguishable from Carbone
49 Id.
50 Id. at 342.
51 Id. at 343 (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992)).
52 See id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 344.
55 Id. at 345. Political safeguards, the ChiefJustice asserted, would prevent "state
control of the economy." Id. at 345 n.7. In any event, the Chief Justice continued,
Congress could step in if a state or municipality abused the exception created here.
See id.
56 See id. at 346-47. Justice Scalia concurred (except for the portion of the major-
ity's opinion engaging in Pike balancing). Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring). For
his part, Justice Thomas concurred, repeating his new position that he will not
enforce the dormant Commerce Clause in any cases. He expressly repudiated his
vote with the Carbone majority and claimed that the antidiscrimination principle finds
no expression in the Commerce Clause. Id. at 349-55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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and accused the majority of creating the public-private distinction out
of whole cloth, which, in any event, he found to be irrelevant for dor-
mant Commerce Clause purposes.57 Justice Alito argued "[tJhe only
real difference between the facility at issue in Carbone and its counter-
part in this case is that title to the former had not yet formally passed
to the municipality."5 8 Having constitutionality turn on such a fine
distinction, Justice Alito complained, elevated form over substance.59
Justice Alito then challenged the three reasons given by the
majority to support the creation of its apparent new exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause.60 He found the assumption that favoring
public entities is not likely motivated by economic protectionism to be
unsupported. "Experience in other countries, where state ownership
is more common ... teaches that governments often discriminate in
favor of state-owned businesses (by shielding them from international
competition) precisely for the purpose of protecting those who derive
economic benefits from those businesses, including their employ-
ees."61 Further, he criticized the majority's apparent focus on ends,
while ignoring the means used, writing that he did not "think it is real-
istic or consistent with our precedents to condemn some discrimina-
tory laws as protectionist while upholding other, equally
discriminatory laws as lawful measures designed to serve legitimate
local interests unrelated to protectionism." 6 2
He criticized the Court's resort to "'traditional' governmental
functions" as a dividing line between permissible and impermissible
regulation, noting that the Court had attempted, then abandoned,
defining traditional governmental functions twice: "first in the context
of intergovernmental tax immunity ... and more recently in the con-
text of state regulatory immunity."63
Finally, he was unimpressed by the majority's contention that the
ordinance was evenhanded insofar as it prohibited both in-state and
out-of-state haulers from processing their garbage other than at the
Authority's site. "Again," he wrote, "the critical issue is whether the
challenged legislation discriminates against interstate commerce. If it
does, then regardless of whether those harmed by it reside entirely
57 See id. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 358-59.
59 Id.
60 See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
61 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 364 (Alito, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
62 Id. at 365.
63 Id. at 369. He also pointed out that even if waste disposal was a traditional
governmental function, it no longer is. Id.
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outside the State in question, the law is subject to strict scrutiny."64 A
state or municipal law "granting monopoly rights to a single, local bus-
iness," he wrote in a footnote, "would not be immune from a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge simply because it excluded both in-state
and out-of-state competitors from the local market."65
About the same time it decided United Haulers, the Court granted
certiorari in Department of Revenue v. Davis. The decision in Davis not
only reaffirmed the public-private distinction created in United Haul-
ers, but it expanded it in important ways.
C. Davis
Like forty-three other states with an income tax, Kentucky taxes
the interest paid on state and municipal bonds, while exempting from
tax the interest paid on those bonds issued by it or its political subdivi-
sions.66 The Davises sued, claiming that this blatant discrimination
violated the dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition on discrimina-
tion. Their position was vindicated by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals;67 the U.S. Supreme Court (which granted certiorari when
the Kentucky Supreme Court declined to hear the case) 68 reversed,
finding that the differential treatment between in-state and out-of-
state bonds did not implicate the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine.69
While acknowledging that the purpose of the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine is to prevent economic isolation and balkaniza-
tion through rules prohibiting interstate commercial discrimination,
the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Souter, began by noting
exceptions to this antidiscrimination principle: the market-participant
exception and the exception created in United Haulers.70 After
describing United Haulers' holding, with particular emphasis on the
reasons the Court gave for not extending the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple to cases in which a public entity was discriminating in favor of
itself, the Court concluded that "[i] t follows a fortiori from United
Haulers that Kentucky must prevail."7 1
64 Id. at 370 (citation omitted).
65 Id. at 371 n.4.
66 See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1804-05 (2008); Davis v. Dep't
of Revenue, 197 S.W.3d 557, 560 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
67 See Davis, 197 S.W.3d at 561-65.
68 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1801.
69 See id. at 1807-08.
70 See id. at 1809-10.
71 Id. at 1810.
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The issuance of bonds to raise revenue for public projects was as
much a "traditional governmental function," the majority noted, as
the collection of garbage. 72 Thus, again the Court could presume
that something more than "simple economic protectionism" was
behind the differential tax treatment as was true in the case of the
force-use ordinance in United Haulers.7 3 "Bond proceeds," it wrote,
"are ... the way to shoulder the cardinal civic responsibilities listed in
United Haulersr protecting the health, safety, and welfare of citizens." 74
The Court also noted that all non-Kentucky bonds (public and
privately issued) were treated the same. The majority stressed that "a
fundamental element of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence" is
that the entities must be similarly situated to maintain a claim for dis-
criminatory treatment.75 Kentucky, it argued, is entitled to favor its
own bonds and those of its political subdivisions because it otherwise
treats all other out-of-state issuers-public and private-the same.
Kentucky's bonds were not, in the Court's view, similarly situated to
other public and private bonds.76 "Just like the ordinances upheld [in
United Haulers], Kentucky's tax exemption favors a traditional govern-
mental function without any differential treatment favoring local enti-
ties over substantially similar out-of-state interests."77
Finally, the majority emphasized "the distinctive character of the
tax policy."7 8 The States themselves supported schemes like Ken-
tucky's and none "perceive [d] any local advantage or disadvantage
beyond the permissible ones open to a government and to those who
deal with it when that government itself enters the market."79
The Court was also persuaded by the argument that, absent tax
schemes like Kentucky's, small municipal borrowers might be
deprived of a source of funds.80 It also observed that this fact, plus the
fact that this taxing practice "often produces a net burden of tax reve-
nues lost over interest expense saved," tend to "underscore [ ] how far
the States' objectives probably lie from the forbidden protectionism
for local business."81 The opinion then concluded with the observa-
tion that upholding the lower court invalidation of Kentucky's tax
72 Id. at 1810-11.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 1811 (footnotes omitted).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1810-11.
77 Id. at 1811.
78 Id. at 1815.
79 Id. at 1815-16.
80 See id. at 1816.
81 Id. at 1817.
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exemption "would upset the market in bonds and the settled expecta-
tions of their issuers based on the experience of nearly a century."8 2
Though he could not command a majority, Justice Souter's alter-
native ground for upholding the exemption was that the exemption
constituted market participation in the bond market by Kentucky.83
"[T]here is no ignoring the fact that imposing the differential tax
scheme makes sense only because Kentucky is also a bond issuer," Jus-
tice Souter wrote.84 "The Commonwealth has entered the market for
debt securities . . . . It simply blinks this reality to disaggregate the
Commonwealth's two roles" of regulator and participant.8 5
Finally, the majority (albeit grudgingly) applied the Pike balanc-
ing test.86 Not surprisingly, the Court had little trouble finding that
benefits like the ability of small municipalities to obtain a source of
funding outweighed any burden on interstate commerce.8 7 More sur-
prising was Justice Souter's expression of doubt that balancing in this
(or any similar) case was within the institutional competence of the
Court.8 8 It was a portion of the majority opinion that could have been
written by Justices Scalia or Thomas, balancing's perennial critics.8 9
As he did in United Haulers, Justice Kennedy dissented, joined
only by Justice Alito.90 Justice Kennedy accused the majority of dis-
carding a long line of cases prohibiting the kind of discrimination in
which Kentucky engaged.91 To justify it by reference to Kentucky's
police power, Kennedy argued, was tautological. "The police power
concept," he wrote, "is simply a shorthand way of saying that a State is
empowered to enact laws in the absence of constitutional constraints;
but, of course, that only restates the question."92 The tax exemption
here, for Kennedy, was simply a tariff-previously thought to be a par-
82 Id. at 1819.
83 See id. at 1811-14 (plurality opinion). OnlyJustices Breyer and Stevens joined
Justice Souter in this portion of the opinion. See id. at 1804 n.*; id. at 1821 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring in part).
84 Id. at 1812 (plurality opinion).
85 Id. For more on this portion of the opinion, see infra Part IV.
86 See id. at 1817-19 (majority opinion). Justice Souter initially questioned
whether, when the Court has concluded that an exception to the antidiscrimination
principle applies, plaintiffs are entitled to a Pike analysis. See id. at 1819-20.
87 See id. at 1818.
88 See id. We discuss the implications of this grudging approach infra Part V.B.
89 As he has traditionally, Justice Scalia refused to join in the portion of the opin-
ion discussing Pike balancing. See id. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
90 Justice Stevens, who joined both in United Haulers, joined the majority. See id.
at 1819 (Stevens, J., concurring).
91 See id. at 1822-23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 1824.
20091 261
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
adigmatic violation of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and
consistently invalidated by the Court.93
Further, Kennedy argued, the majority went further than it had
in United Haulers. There, he argued, the local government had
monopolized the waste collection market, excluding all haulers, in-
state and out-of-state.9 4 By contrast, "Kentucky has not monopolized
the bond market or the municipal bond market. Kentucky has
entered a competitive, nonmonopolized market and, to give its bonds
a market advantage, has taxed out-of-state municipal bonds at a
higher rate."95 In any event, he noted, " [nlo precedent permits the
Court to define a market in terms of the very law under challenge for
protectionist purposes and effects . . . . If the discriminatory barrier
did not exist, then the national market for all state and municipal
bonds would operate like other free, nationwide markets."96
Finally, Kennedy noted that states' unanimous approval of the
discriminatory tax exemptions was illustrative only of the need to
adhere to the antidiscrimination principle. "In the wake of one trade
barrier," he wrote, "retaliatory measures follow . . . . The widespread
nature of these particular trade barriers illustrates the standard
dynamics of politics and economics" and counsel enforcing the
antidiscrimination principle, not creating exceptions to it." If the
Court felt it imperative to avoid disruption to the national market for
bonds, better for it to have created a "sui generis exception" than to, in
Justice Kennedy's view, "weaken [ ] the preventative force of the Com-
merce Clause and invite[ ] other protectionist laws."98
II. ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND THE NEW PUBLIc-ENTITIEs EXCEPTION
In our view, the public-entities exception is a novel, significantly
undertheorized modification to the modem dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. Although the Court has earnestly attempted to por-
tray the exception as the natural outgrowth of the extant dormant
Commerce Clause case law, we believe that the public-entities excep-
tion is an unprecedented limitation on the constitutional prohibition
against protectionist taxes and regulations. Worse, the Court's efforts
to provide a cogent, theoretical explanation for this new restriction on
the antidiscrimination principle are woefully inadequate. As a conse-
93 See id. at 1824-27.
94 See id. at 1827.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1828.
97 Id. at 1829.
98 Id. at 1830.
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quence, we believe that the public-entities exception is an avulsive,
unjustified change in judicial doctrine. In this Part, we critique the
Court's proffered justifications for the exception; in Part III, we
demonstrate how the logic of this new exception cannot be limited to
"public" discrimination, raising the specter that the Court will find it
impossible to simultaneously embrace the New (public) Protectionism
while policing the Old (private) Protectionism.
A. The Court's Proffered Justifications
Prior to its decision in United Haulers, the Court had never before
drawn a distinction between measures intended to protect private
enterprises from outside competition versus those intended to protect
public operations. Indeed, the Court had never even hinted that such
a distinction mattered. In holding the contrary, United Haulers was,
literally, unprecedented.99
A year later, in Davis, the Court reprised each of the three theo-
retical considerations it cited to justify United Haulers-that public-
entity discrimination is different than that benefiting private discrimi-
nation, that "traditional governmental functions" ought to receive dif-
ferent treatment, and that political safeguards could obviate the need
for judicial scrutiny' 0 0-but did so in a way that differed in several
important respects from its discussion in United Haulers.
For example, while repeating that governmental favoritism of its
own functions is likely motivated by something other than "the simple
economic protectionism the Clause abhors," 0 1 the Court did not seek
to determine whether that presumption was true with respect to Ken-
tucky and its municipal bond taxation scheme. Rather, the Court pro-
ceeded to invoke the notion of traditional governmental functions,
99 That the Court would use United Haulers as the vehicle to launch such a dra-
matic change in dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was somewhat surprising. The
Court's preexisting doctrine provided a sufficient basis for resolving the case as it did.
See Norman R. Williams, The Foundations of the American Common Market, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 409, 465-67 (2008). The county waste flow-control ordinances did not
explicitly distinguish along state lines, and, because the entities most directly bur-
dened by the measures were private waste processors, most (if not all) of which were
in-state companies, it was almost certain that the municipal ordinances were not dis-
criminatory in effect. As a consequence, the Court could have reached the same
result by applying traditional dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See id.
100 See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 342-45 (2007); discussion supra Part I.B. See also Zelinsky, supra note 8
(manuscript at 5) ("Davis has broad and disruptive implications by affirming the cen-
trality of the traditional public function doctrine for dormant Commerce Clause
purposes.").
101 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810.
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observing that courts "'should be particularly hesitant to interfere ...
under the guise of the Commerce Clause' where a local government
engages in a traditional government function."10 2 This concern was
particularly appropriate in Davis, the Court warned, because forty-one
states employed a bond taxation scheme identical to Kentucky's and
all of them supported its constitutionality.1 03 In the Court's view,
applying the antidiscrimination principle to tax and regulatory mea-
sures that favor governmental operations would unduly interfere with
state and local governments' ability to discharge their public func-
tions, and, hence, an exception for governmental favoritism of itself
was necessary as a matter of state and local autonomy.10 4
To this point, the Court's reasoning followed in some rough form
the content, if not structure, of its discussion in United Haulers. The
Court, however, then made two striking observations that had no ana-
logue in United Haulers. First, the Court declared that "this emphasis
on the public character of the enterprise" was simply an outgrowth of
"the principle that 'any notion of discrimination assumes a compari-
son of substantially similar entities.'" 1 0 5 Moreover, as counterintuitive
as it seemed (and continues to seem to us), the Court then declared
that one state's municipal bonds are not "substantially similar" to
another state's municipal bonds. 0 6 Citing its 1882 decision in Bona-
parte v. Tax Court,'0 7 the Court ruled that foreign states are properly
treated as private entities when they sell their bonds to out-of-state
residents.108 As such, Kentucky's tax scheme did not discriminate on
the basis of state residency but rather, in the Court's incongruous
view, between private and public issuers. As the Court summed it up,
"[t] here is no forbidden discrimination because Kentucky, as a public
entity, does not have to treat itself as being 'substantially similar' to
the other bond issuers in the market."109
Second, later in the opinion, to further justify its conclusion that
public protectionism was not discriminatory (at least in the context of
municipal bonds), the Court embarked on a curious exploration of
the bond market, assessing how Kentucky's actions affect different
bond markets. Taking the bond market at its broadest-as a national
market in which municipal and private bonds compete-the Court
102 Id. (quoting United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 344).
103 Id. at 1811.
104 Id.
105 Id. (quoting United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 342).
106 See id.
107 104 U.S. 592 (1882).
108 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811.
109 Id.
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noted that Kentucky did not treat out-of-state municipal bonds any
differently than private bonds-that is, it taxed the interest of both. 10
The implication was that, despite the fact that the statute expressly
distinguished along state lines, the fact that in-state private bonds were
also taxed was sufficient to render the measure nondiscriminatory.
Moreover, according to the Court, even if one were to limit the rele-
vant market to that for municipal bonds (thereby excluding private
bonds), Kentucky's actions would still not be constitutionally troub-
ling. Although Kentucky's differential treatment of out-of-state
municipal bonds would be at its "most stark,""' all the states have
supported the constitutionality of such taxation schemes." 2 As the
Court declared, "no State perceives any local advantage or disadvan-
tage beyond the permissible ones open to a government and to those
who deal with it when that government itself enters the market."113
The Court's reasoning seemed to be "if other states are okay with it,
the Constitution is okay with it."
Finally, with respect to the intrastate market for bonds, the Court
noted that there were many single-state municipal bond funds set up
to benefit investors in their home state and that these bond funds
purchased bonds of "smaller or lesser known municipalities that the
interstate markets tend to ignore."114 In the Court's view, Kentucky's
and the other states' "differential"-not "discriminatory"-system of
bond taxation was essential to the continued viability of these single-
state bond funds." 5 In the absence of such tax preferences, the sin-
gle-state bond funds would close, and these "smaller or lesser known"
municipalities would find no market for their bonds.' 16 As the Court
hyperbolically warned, "[f] inancing for long-term municipal improve-
ments would thus change radically if the differential tax feature disap-
peared."" 7 For the Court, that consequence was evidently too much
to bear;' 18 but, even more striking, the Court then linked this conse-
quentialist fear of the outcome of a contrary decision to its earlier
110 See id. at 1815.
111 Id.
112 See Brief for the State of North Carolina et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 1-4, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2115445.
113 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1815-16.
114 Id. at 1816.
115 See id. (noting that "many single-state funds would disappear if the current
differential tax schemes were upset").
116 See id. at 1816-17.
117 Id. at 1816.
118 See id. at 1819 n.21 ("[P]ractical consequences have always been relevant in
deciding the constitutionality of local tax laws.").
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ruminations about the state's likely motives. 119 As the Court
concluded:
[T] he differential tax scheme is critical to the operation of an iden-
tifiable segment of the municipal financial market as it currently
functions, and this fact alone demonstrates that the unanimous
desire of the States to preserve the tax feature is a far cry from the
private protectionism that has driven the development of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause. 120
B. Evaluating the Proffered Rationales
As the foregoing description indicates, the Court has not settled
on one single animating theory to justify the public-entities exception.
Rather, it has offered multiple, sometimes contradictory reasons why
it is permissible for the state to favor its own functions in general or,
more limitedly, to favor at least the sale of in-state municipal bonds.
In our view, none of these theoretical concerns is sufficient to justify
an exception to the antidiscrimination principle for public entities
either in general or with respect to in-state municipal bonds. We take
each proffered justification in turn.
1. The Likelihood of Nonprotectionist Motivation
Let's begin with the Court's claim made for the first time in
United Haulers and reprised in Davis that governmental favoritism is
unlikely to be motivated by base economic protectionism. 121 As a fac-
tual matter, it is unclear why this might be so. Certainly, the Court
offered no evidence for this optimistic assessment of the probable
motives for governmental favoritism of itself, and, as a matter of politi-
cal theory, there is at least some reason to believe that governments
are prone to favor their own operations for protectionist reasons. A
state's preferential treatment of its own operations inevitably benefits
local interests, such as state employees, program beneficiaries (as the
Court expressly and approvingly noted in Davis), local governments,
or some combination thereof.122 Meanwhile, much of the economic
burden of such favoritism falls on unrepresented out-of-state interests,
119 See id. at 1817.
120 Id.
121 See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 343 (2007); see also Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810 (noting that "likely motivation"
for governmental favoritism is a "legitimate objective[ ] distinct from the simple eco-
nomic protectionism the Clause abhors").
122 See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 364 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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such as other states' taxpayers or widely dispersed shareholders. 123 As
a consequence, for the same reason that state and local governments
are prone to adopt protectionist measures to favor local businesses at
the expense of out-of-state competitors, they are predisposed to enact
protectionist measures to favor their own operations at the expense of
other states or private competitors.
Moreover, even if the Court's assessment of the probable reasons
for governmental favoritism were true (or even true most of the time),
it would not justify a categorical rule deeming such measures as per se
nondiscriminatory and thereby exempting them from the very judicial
scrutiny that is necessary to determine the bona fides of the govern-
ment's motives. Only by asking whether a state is pursuing a legiti-
mate governmental objective and whether there are no other
reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternative means to achieve that end
can the Court be sure that a state is not acting on forbidden protec-
tionist motives. 124
To see how, take City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey. 25 There, New
Jersey forbade the importation of solid waste from other states. New
Jersey defended the measure on the facially plausible ground that it
needed to conserve scarce landfill capacity.126 The Court, though,
correctly deemed the measure as discriminatory and subjected it to
rigorous scrutiny, which revealed a more sinister, protectionist origin
for the law.127 Although the state's professed interest in conserving
landfill space was clearly legitimate, the means selected by New Jersey
(banning out-of-state waste while allowing in-state waste generators to
dump as much garbage in New Jersey landfills as they wanted) belied
the notion that protectionist motives did not animate New Jersey's
adoption of the law.128 By treating the New Jersey solid waste law as
discriminatory and applying the rigorous scrutiny reserved for such
measures, the Court was able to see through New Jersey's protestation
of innocent motives.
In contrast, Davis illustrates the danger of the contrary approach
embraced by the Court. Kentucky's protectionist motives were, in
123 To be sure, protectionism inevitably imposes some burden on in-state interests,
such as, in Davis, resident taxpayers who own out-of-state municipal bonds. Such in-
state burdens, however, do not often translate into substantial in-state political opposi-
tion because of collective action problems and because the state often finds other
ways to mollify in-state opponents. See Williams, supra note 99, at 437-44.
124 United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 366 (Alito, J., dissenting).
125 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
126 See id. at 625.
127 See id. at 627.
128 See id. at 629.
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fact, readily apparent. Indeed, the Court itself approvingly acknowl-
edged that Kentucky adopted the discriminatory taxation scheme so
as to discourage Kentucky residents from purchasing bonds issued by
other states and, correspondingly, to encourage them (and the single-
state bond funds in which they invest) to purchase only Kentucky-
originated municipal bonds.129 This is a classic example of protec-
tionism at work, yet, because of the Court's holding, Kentucky was
excused from the need to defend its actions on nonprotectionist
grounds.
2. Traditional Governmental Functions
Nor is there any more force to the Court's claim that governmen-
tal favoritism of its own functions must be tolerated as matter of state
autonomy when the government is discharging its "traditional govern-
mental functions." As the Court made clear in Davis, the underlying
foundation for this argument is the fear that judicial review pursuant
to the dormant Commerce Clause will disrupt or interfere with the
states' ability to perform these functions. 30 The Court, however, can-
not really mean that. Judicial review under the dormant Commerce
Clause is not a roving, Lochner-esque license for the Court to sit as a
super-legislature, second-guessing the substantive merits of state and
local laws.131 Rather, it is only when a law discriminates against inter-
state commerce that searching judicial scrutiny is triggered. Hence,
so long as state and local governments do not enact discriminatory
measures, they remain free to pursue whatever policies they wish and,
not to be too snotty about it, to discharge their "traditional govern-
mental functions" in whatever manner they wish. States, for example,
can continue to issue state bonds and to tax the interest on those
bonds in whatever manner they wish; they just cannot do so in a dis-
criminatory fashion (at least without a sufficiently strong, nonprotec-
tionist justification).
Moreover, even if we were to believe that such judicial review was
inappropriately intrusive and disrespectful of state autonomy, the
Court's traditional governmental functions rule would hardly serve as
a clear indicator of what governmental services qualify for such favorit-
ism. At one time, the Court deployed a similar test so as to protect
129 See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1816 (2008).
130 See id. at 1810-11; see also id. at 1820-21 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part) (discuss-
ing the state's alternatives).
131 Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58-60 (1905) (striking down a restric-
tion on bakers' hours because of disagreement with New York's assessment of the
health threat posed by bakery working conditions).
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state and local operations from federal interference pursuant to the
Tenth Amendment. This was the "integral governmental functions"
rule of National League of Cities v. Usery.IS2 The Court, however, subse-
quently overruled Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transpor-
tation Authority,'3 3 holding that the "integral governmental functions"
rule was both unworkable in practice and unsound in principle.13 4 As
the Court explained at that time, the line distinguishing between inte-
gral or traditional governmental functions and other state govern-
mental functions was "elusive at best."1 3 5 The Court particularly
worried that the integral government functions rule required
unelected federal judges to make unprincipled decisions as to which
state functions were sufficiently important to warrant immunity from
federal regulation.1 3 6 Those same concerns apply with equal force to
the Court's attempt to resurrect Usery in the name of protecting some
state and local governmental functions from competition from other
state or local governments or private enterprises.13 7
To be sure, the Court in Davis acknowledged this point. In a
footnote, the majority reassures us that it does not intend to resurrect
Usery; in its view, the traditional governmental functions analysis serves
a different purpose and can therefore be performed in a coherent,
objective manner:
The point of asking whether the challenged governmental prefer-
ence operated to support a traditional public function was not to
draw fine distinctions among governmental functions, but to find
out whether the preference was for the benefit of a government
fulfilling governmental obligations or for the benefit of private
interests, favored because they were local. Under United Haulers,
governmental public preference is constitutionally different from
commercial private preference, and we make the governmental
responsibility enquiry to identify the beneficiary as one or the other.
Because this is the distinction at which the enquiry about traditional
governmental activity is aimed, it entails neither tautology nor the
132 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (holding that Congress's commerce power did not
authorize Congress to regulate the "integral governmental functions" of state and
local governments).
133 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
134 See id. at 546.
135 Id. at 539.
136 See id. at 545-46; Zelinsky, supra note 8 (manuscript at 5) ("[T]he 'traditional
public function' category, which has become central to the Roberts Court's dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, lacks persuasive boundaries and undermines prior case
law.").
137 Cf United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 369 (2007) (Alito., J., dissenting) (noting similarity to Usery).
2oo91 269
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
hopeless effort to pick and choose among legitimate governmental
activity that led to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.1 38
The majority's reassurance notwithstanding, it is entirely unclear
how the Court intends to avoid the subjective, unprincipled "picking
and choosing" that was the downfall of the traditional government
functions test in the Tenth Amendment context. The Court's declara-
tion that the test serves a different purpose in the dormant Commerce
Clause context is entirely beside the point; the problem with the
"traditional governmental function" inquiry was not its purpose but its
lack of objective content. To say that some governmental functions
are traditional implies that there are some governmental functions
that are nontraditional (and which the government can therefore not
favor through discriminatory regulations and taxes). And just as the
Court in Usery failed to offer any guidance as to how the lower federal
and state courts were to distinguish between the two types of govern-
mental functions, the Court in United Haulers and Davis failed to pro-
vide any illumination. The Court has declared without elaboration or
explanation that solid waste disposal and, now, bond issuance are
traditional governmental functions, 139 but the conclusory nature of
those proclamations serves only to reinforce the notion that the tradi-
tional government function test lacks any objective content-that it is
merely a post hoc label summarily attached by the Court to some gov-
ernmental operations.
3. Virtual Representation
Likewise, there is no merit to the Court's alternative argument
thatjudicial review of governmental favoritism of its own operations is
unnecessary because other in-state interests, such as businesses that
must pay higher prices for waste disposal services or resident taxpayers
who must pay tax on the interest on their out-of-state municipal
138 Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810 n.9 (2008) (citations omitted).
139 See id. at 1810 ("[T]he issuance of debt securities to pay for public projects is a
quintessentially public function . . . ."); United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 344 ("'[W]aste
disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function.'" (quoting
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 261 F.3d 245,
264 (2d Cir. 2001))). But see Zelinsky, supra note 8 (manuscript at 26) ("[I]t is arbi-
trary to decide when a particular public practice is old enough to be deemed 'tradi-
tional.' Tradition is very much in the eye of the beholder. It is, moreover, equally
arbitrary to deem certain governmental activities as 'public' and others as not."); id.
(manuscript at 39) (arguing that the distinction between public and nonpublic func-
tions is so broad as to be "indeterminate").
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bonds, are also harmed by such governmental favoritism. 140 Presuma-
bly, the implication is that in-state interests burdened by the measure
serve as virtual representatives of out-of-state interests, and, therefore,
the domestic political process can be trusted to take account of the
measure's full costs and benefits.
It is hard to understand exactly what to make of this observation.
On the one hand, the Court seems to be suggesting that any localized
burden is sufficient to insulate regulations or taxes from stringent
judicial review.1 41 Yet, that view proves far too much: almost all regu-
lations and taxes impose some local burdens, usually in the form of
higher costs for local consumers or lower revenue for local producers
of the regulated or taxed good or service. Tariffs on out-of-state goods
impose burdens on local consumers, yet they are clearly unconstitu-
tional despite that fact.142 Were it sufficient to insulate governmental
favoritism from judicial review on this ground, all taxes and regula-
tions that burden in-state interests-that is to say all taxes and regula-
tions no matter how nakedly protectionist-would be exempt from
judicial review. On this view, there would be no dormant Commerce
Clause at all, and close to two centuries worth of Supreme Court
precedents applying the dormant Commerce Clause would have to be
overturned.
Perhaps the Court meant to suggest only that judicial review of
state and local taxes and regulations is not necessary when there are a
sufficient number of in-state interests harmed by a measure such that
the state's political processes can be trusted to ensure that the mea-
sure is not protectionist. Of course, the devil is in determining exactly
what is a sufficient number: Must the measure adversely impact fifty
percent of the state's electorate? Thirty-three percent? Ten percent?
Resolving that question involves highly complex and contested issues
of political science regarding interest group vitality and voting behav-
ior.14 s Moreover, even if there were some consensus regarding the
threshold above which native opposition could substitute for judicial
review, the Court made no effort to describe how courts are to deter-
140 See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 345.
141 See id.
142 See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193, 203 (1994).
143 CompareJulian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
425, 460-61 (1982) (arguing that judicial review is necessary only when out-of-state
interests are disproportionately affected by a measure), withJames M. O'Fallon, The
Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Comment, 61 OR. L. REv. 395, 413 (1982) ("The presence
of adversely affected constituents, even in significant numbers, by no means assures
that the balance of interests represented accurately reflects the balance of interests in
the nation as a whole.").
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mine whether the adversely affected residents are sufficiently numer-
ous to serve as a politically substantial opposition. In short, despite
the Court's professed concern for respecting state and local political
processes, this rationale actually would embroil the Court in difficult
and politically charged tasks far beyond the Court's traditional
competence.
4. Public vs. Private Protectionism
In light of the weaknesses in the foregoing justifications, which
first appeared in United Haulers, perhaps it is not surprising that the
Court in Davis attempted to augment them in several respects. Most
notably, the Court ruled that governmental favoritism of its own oper-
ations is acceptable because the favored operations are not "substan-
tially similar" to private operations.144 When the government engages
in trash processing, for example, it is not like private trash proces-
sors. 45 Moreover, in the Court's view, it is only when a government
regulates or taxes so as to favor private, in-state economic interests that
its actions are protectionist. 146 From these two premises-that gov-
ernmental favoritism of itself is different in character from govern-
mental favoritism of private entities and that only the latter is truly
protectionist-the Court concludes that the dormant Commerce
Clause does not prohibit public entities from favoring their own oper-
ations either at the expense of private enterprises (United Haulers) or
out-of-state governments (Davis).
Unfortunately for the Court, neither premise holds water, and,
therefore, the Court's conclusion is a non sequitur. Take the first step
in this syllogism-that governmental operations are not "substantially
similar" to private operations of the same character. The substantially
similar inquiry traces its roots to General Motors Corp. v. Tracy,147 in
which the Court used the analysis to determine whether an Ohio stat-
ute that exempted natural gas utilities from the state's sales and use
taxes on natural gas was discriminatory.14 8  The statute did not
expressly discriminate along state lines, but, because all interstate gas
marketers were out-of-state and all the benefited natural gas utilities
144 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811.
145 See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 342-43 (noting that the responsibilities of
"health, safety, and welfare" for citizens "set state and local government apart from a
typical private business").
146 This is implicit in the Court's repeated statements that governmental favorit-
ism is unlikely to be protectionist and the Court's condemnation only of, as it tellingly
put it, "private protectionism." See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817.
147 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
148 See id. at 298-310.
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were in-state, there was at least the suspicion that Ohio had acted so as
to benefit in-state entities at the expense of their out-of-state competi-
tors.14 9 As the Court explained, to determine whether that was in fact
the case required it to ascertain whether the utilities were substantially
similar to the natural gas wholesalers, which involved a two-step analy-
sis of whether the products offered were the same and, if so, whether
the utilities and wholesalers competed in the same market.15 0 Accord-
ing to the Court in Tracy, the whole purpose of the "substantially simi-
lar" inquiry was to determine whether there was a competitive
relationship between the favored and disfavored goods or compa-
nies.151 Only if such a competitive relationship existed was the differ-
ential treatment protectionist. 1 52 On the other hand, if the favored
and disfavored entities produced different products serving different
markets, "eliminating the tax or other regulatory differential would
not serve the dormant Commerce Clause's fundamental objective of
preserving a national market for competition undisturbed by prefer-
ential advantages conferred by a State upon its residents or resident
competitors."153
In Davis, however, the Court grossly distorted the "substantially
similar" inquiry. To begin with, the Court in Tracy had made clear
that the substantial inquiry was applicable only to facially neutral stat-
utes that were allegedly discriminatory in effect;154 facial discrimina-
tory statutes, such as Kentucky's municipal bond taxation statute, did
not require such a threshold inquiry, presumably because the mere
fact that the state has legislated expressly along state lines raises a pre-
sumption of likeness among the excluded and included entities.1 5 5
Even so, the Davis Court made no effort to undertake the two-step
process outlined in Tracy. Had it done so, of course, the result would
have been clear (and contrary to the Court's ultimate conclusion): A
municipal bond is a municipal bond, and there is no doubt that Ken-
tucky and its local governments competed in the same nationwide
municipal bond market as other states. Indeed, in Davis, the Court
relied precisely on the need to prevent competition from other states'
149 Id. at 287-88. GM characterized such discrimination as "facial" or "patent,"
but the Court's treatment of the case demonstrates that it viewed the relevant discrim-
ination as one "in effect." See id. at 287, 307 n.15.
150 See id. at 298-99.
151 See id.
152 Id. at 300.
153 Id. at 299.
154 See id. at 307 n.15.
155 See id.
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municipal bonds as a constitutionally sufficient justification for Ken-
tucky's and the other states' actions.' 56
More fundamentally, the Court's more general, implicit supposi-
tion that public entities are different from private entities when they
perform the same tasks is deeply flawed. According to the Court, even
when the government performs functions in competition with other
private entities, the government differs from private entities because it
acts on behalf of the public's health, safety, and welfare.157 Of course,
that hardly differentiates one public entity (e.g., Kentucky) from
other public entities (e.g., Ohio), who presumably also act on such
concerns. More importantly, the Court's answer begs the question-
whether the public entity is motivated by protectionism or bona fide
public policy concerns is precisely the issue before the Court in these
cases. Once again, the Court is excusing states from the obligation to
demonstrate the bona fides of their action by assuming the bona fides
of their action. Moreover, even if the governments entered the com-
petitive market for altruistic reasons, those reasons are not sufficient
to justify their adoption of protectionist taxes or regulations designed
to insulate their operations from competition.1 58 A county may
decide to offer waste-processing services to its citizens because it
believes it can do so in a more environmentally responsible manner
than private companies, but that does not mean that its distinct and
subsequent policy decision to use its tax or regulatory powers to insu-
late its operations from private or public competition was similarly
motivated by altruistic, nonprotectionist reasons.
Likewise, the Court's second premise-that only governmental
favoritism of private entities constitutes protectionism-fails to with-
stand scrutiny. Again, the Court never explains why public protection-
ism is of no constitutional moment. Prior to United Haulers, the Court
had routinely defined the protectionism forbidden by the dormant
Commerce Clause in a broad, categorical fashion as that governmen-
tal action "designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burden-
ing out-of-state competitors."159 Nor does it make any sense to treat
156 See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1816-17 (2008).
157 See id. at 1811; United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 342-43 (2007).
158 As the Court noted in City of Philadelphia, protectionism can manifest itself in
the legislative means employed by the state. See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 627 (1978).
159 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988); see also Davis, 128 S.
Ct. at 1808 (identifying the concern addressed by the modem dormant Commerce
Clause as regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state interests by burdening out-
of-state competitors).
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public protectionism any differently as a constitutional matter than
private protectionism. The same dangers posed by private protection-
ism-the disruption of economic union, the encouragement for other
states to retaliate in kind, and the distortion of the national common
market-are also presented by public protectionism. When a govern-
ment undertakes some action or function that competes with other
entities, it will have every incentive to use its taxation and regulatory
authority to protect its operation from such competition, and its
efforts in that respect will produce the same dangerous centrifugal
tendencies that the dormant Commerce Clause was meant to forestall.
Thus, in our view, a protectionist tax is a protectionist tax, regardless
of whether the beneficiary of the tax is public or private.
To be sure, the Court attempted to deflect this concern about
national disunion, at least with respect to public protectionism in the
context of municipal bond taxation, by noting at several points in
Davis that virtually every state has a similarly discriminatory bond taxa-
tion scheme and that all fifty states support the constitutionality of
such a scheme.o60 The Court evidently reads this unanimity as evi-
dence that public protectionism in this area does not threaten the
union.' 6 ' Yet, what is more telling in our view is that every state but
one with a state income tax has adopted a similarly discriminatory
municipal bond taxation scheme. 62 In short, the proof of the retalia-
tory impetus created by such discriminatory measures is in the pud-
ding: all but one state with a state income tax has responded to other
states' discrimination by adopting similarly discriminatory mea-
sures.163 And the fact that, now, all the states are happy with the status
quo is both entirely unsurprising-states are likely to overestimate the
costs and underestimate the benefits of moving to a national common
market for municipal bonds164-and entirely beside the point as a
160 See, e.g., Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811. Besides Kentucky, which is a party to the
case, the other forty-nine states signed an amicus brief supporting the constitutional-
ity of such discriminatory municipal bond taxation. See id.
161 See id. at 1815-16.
162 As the Court noted, forty-one states tax the interest earned on out-of-state
municipal bonds while exempting the interest on some or all in-state municipal
bonds. Id. at 1806-07 & n.7. Seven states do not have a state income tax. See id.
Only Indiana exempts from its state income tax the interest earned on all municipal
bonds regardless of source. See id. at 1807 n.7; see also IND. CODE § 6-3-1-3.5 (2007 &
Supp. 2009) (providing this exemption).
163 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
164 Indeed, as the Court itself noted and emphasized, an entire industry depen-
dent upon this system of protectionism has emerged. Id. at 1816 (majority opinion);
see also id. at 1822-23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing how such protectionism
has "distorted" state and municipal bond markets). It is hardly surprising that this
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legal matter-unanimous consent by all the states to a system of pro-
tectionist taxes and regulations would not (and should not) insulate
them from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.1 6 5
5. Municipal Bond Market Exceptionalism
All of the foregoing justifications are alike in one respect: they all
bear upon the broad issue whether, generally speaking, governmental
favoritism of itself is immune from dormant Commerce Clause scru-
tiny. For the reasons already discussed, we do not believe that these
rationales are persuasive. In Davis, however, the Court appended one
last justification that is unique to (and therefore limited to) the taxa-
tion of municipal bonds. Specifically, the Court argued that no mat-
ter in which bond market Kentucky's actions are evaluated (national,
municipal, or intrastate), such favoritism does not bespeak the type of
protectionist action with which the dormant Commerce Clause is con-
cerned.16 6 Moreover, focusing on the intrastate bond market in par-
ticular, the Court feared that a contrary ruling would decimate the
ability of small, local governments to find willing purchasers for their
bonds, thereby severely hampering the financing of public projects in
these communities. The unstated implication was that, even if a
broad exception to the dormant Commerce Clause for all governmen-
tal favoritism of itself was not justified, at least favorable tax treatment
for in-state municipal bonds poses no constitutional concern.1 6 7
As an initial matter, we do not see any legitimate basis for the
Court to pick and choose the market in which to analyze state regula-
tions or taxes. If a state law is discriminatory with respect to any mar-
ket, it is discriminatory period. Thus, once the Court acknowledged
in Davis that Kentucky's municipal bond tax actions were discrimina-
tory when viewed in light of the national municipal bond market,16 8
that should have been the end of the story.
industry now warns both the states and the Court of the disaster that would allegedly
befall the nation were municipal bonds treated the same way as and subject to the
same constitutional rules as milk (West Lynn Creamery v. Healy) or solid waste (City of
Philadelphia v. NewJersey). See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association in Support of Petitioners at 5, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801
(No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2115447 ("If the municipal bond tax incentive evaporates, the
demand for such bonds may likewise vanish, thus drying up a major source of funding
for State projects.").
165 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1828-29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166 See id. at 1815-17 (majority opinion).
167 See id. at 1830 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168 See id. at 1815 (majority opinion). The Court dismisses the relevance of this
conclusion on the ground that all forty-nine states have consented to such discrimina-
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Of course, it is precisely to avoid the consequences of that indis-
putable conclusion that the Court evaluated the impact of Kentucky's
actions in light of other markets in which the discriminatory character
of Kentucky's action disappears. By viewing Kentucky's actions from
the broader perspective of the national bond market generally, the
Court was able to declare that Kentucky has not discriminated against
out-of-state municipal bonds because they are treated no differently
than private bonds issued by Kentucky companies.169 In raising the
level of market generality at which Kentucky's actions are evaluated in
this way, the discriminatory character of Kentucky's actions evapo-
rates. Likewise, by analyzing Kentucky's actions more narrowly in
light only of the intrastate bond market, the discriminatory character
of Kentucky's actions also disappears because, viewed in this artificial
light, the only disfavored bonds are those issued by in-state private
companies. 170 As the Court noted without the least sense of irony,
"[b]y definition, there is no discrimination against interstate activity
within the [intrastate] market itself." 71
We do not see nor did the Court explain how those observations
render moot or trump the fact that Kentucky's action is discriminatory
when viewed against the national municipal bond market in which
Kentucky indisputably participates. More importantly, this analytical
approach poses great dangers for dormant Commerce Clause adjudi-
cation in other cases, because the discriminatory character of all pro-
tectionist actions, even manifestly unconstitutional tariffs, can be
concealed in this fashion. For that reason, until Davis, the Court had
rejected such analytical sophistry. For example, in New Energy Co. v.
Limbach,172 the Court invalidated Ohio's sales tax credit for ethanol
manufactured in the state. The Court evaluated Ohio's action in light
of the market for ethanol, against which the discriminatory character
of Ohio's tax credit was manifestly apparent.'73 Of course, had the
Court (as it did in Davis) abstracted a bit and viewed Ohio's action in
light of the market for all fuel products generally, the discriminatory
character of the ethanol tax credit would have disappeared because
in-state gasoline was being treated no differently than out-of-state eth-
anol. Similarly, had the Court (as it did in Davis) narrowed its focus
and viewed Ohio's action in light of the intrastate market for fuel, the
tion. See id. For the reasons discussed above, however, that response is entirely inap-
posite. See supra text accompanying notes 160-65.
169 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1815.
170 Id. at 1816.
171 Id.
172 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
173 Id. at 274.
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discriminatory character of the ethanol tax credit would have disap-
peared because it only burdened in-state gasoline producers. That
the Court did not engage in such misleading analytical perspectives in
New Energy (or other cases) suggests the error of its doing so in Davis.
Lastly, we are entirely unmoved by the Court's corollary, conse-
quentialist fear that a contrary ruling would decimate public financing
by small municipalities. 174 Even were the Court's fear likely to be
proven true-and we have our doubts17 5-that would at most suggest
carving a minimal exception to the dormant Commerce Clause exclu-
sively for municipal bonds issued by local governments with limited
access to national capital markets, not all public bonds.17 6 More to
the point, however, the answer to this concern was made most
powerfully more than a half-century ago by Justice Cardozo, who
rejected a similar defense of protectionism made on behalf of small
dairy farmers:
Economic welfare is always related to health, for there can be no
health if men are starving. Let such an exception be admitted, and
all that a state will have to do in times of stress and strain is to say
that its farmers and merchants and workmen must be protected
against competition from without, lest they go upon the poor relief
lists or perish altogether. To give entrance to that excuse would be
to invite a speedy end of our national solidarity. The Constitution
was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less paro-
chial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of
the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long
run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.'
7 7
174 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1816.
175 Kentucky seeks to discourage Kentucky residents from buying out-of-state
municipal bonds so as to encourage them to buy the bonds offered by in-state local
governments. Yet small Kentucky cities are only better off if Kentucky's protectionist
tax scheme produces more native investment in its cities' bonds than they would
obtain from nonresidents if the latter were able to purchase Kentucky bonds on a
nondiscriminatory basis. For small states with relatively small amounts of private capi-
tal held by residents available for such domestic investment, the superiority of the
current system versus that of a national common market in public financing (where
Kentucky municipalities would be on equal footing with all other municipalities in
attracting capital from investors in all the states) is far from certain.
176 One might add that, even if such an exception is desirable, it should be made
by Congress pursuant to its authority to authorize discriminatory action pursuant to
its commerce power. But see Williams, supra note 27 (criticizing the validity of such
congressional power).
177 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
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In sum, United Haulers and Davis mark a fundamental turn in the
Court's approach to the dormant Commerce Clause. Its embrace of a
public-entities exception to the antidiscrimination principle is truly
revolutionary. Unfortunately, the Court has failed to provide a suffi-
cient justification for such an avulsive change in its doctrine. The
hodgepodge of policy concerns identified by the Court do not with-
stand serious scrutiny, and its most comprehensive explanation for
the change-that public protectionism is different than private pro-
tectionism-is rooted in neither the text, history, nor theory of the
dormant Commerce Clause. Indeed, it is drawn out of thin air.
III. THE PUBLIc-ENTITIES EXCEPTION AND THE BIRTH
OF THE NEW PROTECTIONISM
While we believe the public-entities exception to the antidis-
crimination principle to be an unprecedented and unjustified depar-
ture from the modern dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, we take
the exception as a given and focus in this part on what it portends for
the future. In our view, the exception invites state and local govern-
ments to engage in protectionism in a variety of contexts and will
embroil the courts, both federal and state, in the difficult task of dis-
tinguishing between public and private protectionism.1 7 8 More fun-
damentally, the underlying jurisprudential forces that gave rise to it
are likely to destabilize the modern dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine, opening the door to a new reassessment by the Court of its role
in reviewing state and local taxes and regulations.1 79
A. Municipal Garbage Processing and Bond Favoritism
Obviously, the most immediate impact of the United Haulers and
Davis decisions will be felt, respectively, in the municipal solid waste
processing and municipal bond arenas. In United Haulers, the Court
upheld solid waste flow-control ordinances adopted by two counties in
the middle of New York. Because of the counties' geographic loca-
tion, it was unlikely that out-of-state garbage processors bore much, let
alone a disproportionate share, of the burden of the measure.18 0 The
178 For a similar discussion of the potential ramifications of this exception, see
Coenen, United Haulers, supra note 8 (manuscript at 23-79).
179 See also id. (manuscript at 5) ("[C] ourts must be ever-mindful that United Haul-
ers and Davis reflect a doctrinal amibitiousness that the opinions in those cases tend to
understate.").
180 See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 345-46 (2007).
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Court's approval of such municipal favoritism, however, did not turn
on such geographic fortuity.181 Hence, United Haulers licenses coun-
ties on or near state borders-where the impact of such flow-control
ordinances may be felt primarily or exclusively by out-of-state proces-
sors-to adopt such flow-control ordinances. And, if a county can do
it, so too can a state. Hence, states may similarly "nationalize" their
solid-waste-processing facilities and then require all in-state waste gen-
erators to have their waste processed at the state-owned facilities. The
impact on private waste processors could be immense.
Meanwhile, while Davis dealt with only a modest tax break for in-
state municipal bonds,182 the decision's ratio decendi-that state efforts
to privilege in-state municipal bonds over their out-of-state competi-
tors are nondiscriminatory and therefore exempt from "standard dor-
mant Commerce Clause scrutiny"' 83-licenses states to adopt more
robust measures to encourage residents to purchase in-state municipal
bonds. States, for example, might levy a punitive tax on the interest of
out-of-state bonds or, better yet, simply forbid state residents from
purchasing or owning out-of-state municipal bonds. 184 The only dif-
ference between Kentucky's modest tax break and these hypothetical
measures is the degree of the favoritism, but the Court has long made
clear that the extent of the favoritism is irrelevant to the determina-
tion of whether a measure is discriminatory.185 Thus, at a minimum,
Davis will likely encourage states to experiment with more robust
mechanisms to "encourage" state residents to purchase in-state munic-
ipal bonds rather than out-of-state municipal bonds.
B. Public Protectionism
More profoundly, United Haulers and Davis embrace an exception
to the antidiscrimination principle for state and local taxes and regu-
lations that favor governmental operations over private and public
competitors. While United Haulers formally dealt only with favoritism
with respect to municipal waste processing and Davis with respect to
municipal bonds, the Court's language and reasoning suggest a much
broader rule endorsing governmental favoritism of itself generally. As
a consequence, another likely impact of the Court's embrace of public
protectionism will be to encourage state and local governments to
181 See id. at 342-47.
182 The value of the preference is greatest in those states with the highest state
income taxes.
183 Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810 (2008).
184 Id. at 1829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
185 See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 269 (1984).
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adopt taxes and regulations that protect other governmental opera-
tions from competition.
The practical impact of this exception could be huge. In modern
America, state and local governments perform many functions and
provide many services to state and local residents. For example, they
own and operate solid waste processing or disposal facilities; they
operate public schools, including public universities and graduate
schools; and they provide health care through publicly owned health
centers and hospitals, to name just a few prominent ones. Under the
public-entities exception, states could adopt taxes or regulations that
encourage or even require state residents to use these municipal facili-
ties rather than other facilities. Thus, for example, to encourage
more in-state students to attend the state's own university, a state
could levy a higher tax on the income of every graduate of private or
out-of-state universities. Or, to ensure maximum occupancy at state-
owned hospitals, a state could forbid residents from seeking medical
care at non-state owned hospitals. 8 6 For every state or municipally
owned facility, United Haulers and Davis ostensibly license the adop-
tion of taxes and regulations to protect such facilities from
competition.
To be sure, we do not expect the widespread proliferation of such
taxes and regulations, at least not immediately. The benefits of free
trade in such goods and services may discourage state and local gov-
ernments from adopting many such mercantilist measures, and, even
if they do, some of the most egregious examples of such public protec-
tionism may run afoul of other constitutional guarantees.18 7 Moreo-
ver, Congress could potentially respond by statutorily forbidding
public protectionism in particular industries.188 At the same time,
however, these alternative safeguards have their own weaknesses.
State political processes are prone to overestimate the benefits of pro-
tectionism; other federal constitutional guarantees do not cover the
full range of possible governmental favoritism; and Congress may not
186 These are not the only examples. State and local governments are engaged in
a myriad of activities. South Dakota, for example, used to own and operate a cement
factory. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446-47 (1980) (upholding state
requirement banning out-of-state individuals from purchasing cement from state-
owned cement plant). Under Davis, South Dakota could have adopted a regulation
requiring all construction projects in the state to use cement from the factory.
187 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925) (holding that
state law requiring all elementary school children to attend public schools violated
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
188 Cf United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 345 n.7 (2007) (noting that Congress may use its commerce power "to limit
state use of exclusive franchises").
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respond to such public protectionism, particularly that at the local
level, which may escape its radar.189
C. Quasi Public-Private Protectionism
Perhaps most dangerously, the Court has unwittingly opened the
door to governmental efforts to use discriminatory taxes and regula-
tions to favor private businesses in certain circumstances. At the heart
of these decisions lie the Court's twin beliefs that there is a difference
between public and private operations and that it is easy to distinguish
between the two.190 In our view, however, the Court has fundamen-
tally failed to appreciate the extent to which government and private
operations are and can be comingled, thereby inviting state and local
governments to use the public-entities exception to benefit nominally
private entities that have some connection with the government.
Moreover, as to these "mixed" entities, the Court itself has offered no
guidance regarding the applicability of the public-entities exception,
and, therefore, lower courts will find themselves embroiled in the dif-
ficult task of determining whether particular entities favored by the
state through some discriminatory tax or regulatory provision qualify
as public entities for purposes of this exception to the antidiscrimina-
tion principle.
State and local governments interact with nominally private com-
panies in a variety of ways that muddle the distinction between the
two. Most notably, state and local governments often possess a sub-
stantial ownership interest in private companies. Such ownership is
typically not held directly by the state itself, as it is in Europe; rather,
in the United States, state and local governments typically own sub-
stantial shareholdings through their public pension funds. In particu-
lar, there are over 2600 state and local government pension funds,
which collectively control almost $2.9 trillion in assets.191 Although
much of these funds are invested in fixed-income debt securities (e.g.,
government and corporate bonds), state and local governmen, pen-
sion funds own over $1.1 trillion of shares of private companies. 92
Several of the pension funds are truly huge, even by national stan-
dards. The California state pension system for example has, as ofJuly
189 See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring in
the result); see also infra text accompanying notes 225-26.
190 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810 n.9.
191 See U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, 2006 STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE-
RETIREMENT SYSTEMs, at tbl. 5A (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/govs/
retire/2006retO5a.html.
192 See id. at tbl. 4a(3), available at http://www.census.gov/govs/retire/2006ret
04a-3.html.
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31, 2009, over $190 billion in funds under management, $119 billion
of which is invested in the stock of private companies.193
Moreover, even apart from the government's ownership of
shares, state and local governments also interact with private compa-
nies in other ways. For example, state and local governments often
contract with private companies to render services to state and local
residents. This movement toward the "privatization" of public services
by state and local governments has been widely documented and dis-
cussed.' 94 Likewise, state and local governments provide financial
assistance to local companies through direct subsidies, tax exemp-
tions, and tax abatements. 195 Many of these subsidies take the form of
a business development incentive, in which the state or local govern-
ment provides some subsidy or tax break in return for a company's
agreement to build or expand its operations in the state or
municipality.19 6
Not all private companies will qualify as public entities for pur-
poses of this exception by virtue of these types of relationships with
the government, but many will, and identifying the nature and scope
of the requisite relationship to the government will prove no easy task.
Take, for example, governmental stock ownership. Surely a company
in which the state government owns ninety percent of the outstanding
shares constitutes a public entity.197 But what about closer cases, such
when the government owns only sixty percent of the shares? Or forty
percent? Or does the answer turn on the actual dollar amount
invested? New York's public pension fund, for example, owns over
$1.5 billion in shares of Exxon Mobil Corporation.198 That may be a
small percentage of the total market value of Exxon Mobil,199 but that
193 See CalPERs, Investments, FACTS AT A GLANCE (Cal. Public Employees' Retire-
ment System, Sacramento, Cal.), Oct. 2009, at 1, available at lttp://www.calpers.ca.
gov/eip-docs/about/facts/investme.pdf.
194 See, e.gJannaJ. Hansen, Limits of Competition: Accountability in Government Con-
tracting, 112 YALE L. J. 2465, 2465 (2003) ("Government contracts with private provid-
ers for the supply of goods and services have grown in number and magnitude over
the last several decades.").
195 See Williams, supra note 30, at 478-79.
196 Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L. REV. 377, 397 (1996).
197 Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2) (2006) (defining corporations in which a foreign
state owns a majority of shares as instrumentalities of the foreign state).
198 See N.Y. STATE COMMON RET. FUND., ASSET LiSTING AS OF MARCH 31, 2007, at 22,
available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/retire/word and-pdf-documents/publica-
tions/catr/asset listings_07.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
199 As of March 28, 2008, Exxon Mobil's total market value was almost $456 bil-
lion. See Our Annual Ranking of America's Largest Corporations, FORTUNE, May 5, 2008,
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is a lot of money to New York State and its pensioners. One can imag-
ine a state arguing that the value of its investment is so great and so
important to the state itself that the company should be treated as a
public entity for purposes of allowing the state to favor its operations.
Indeed, doesn't New York have a greater interest in protecting Exxon
Mobil (and the state's $1.5 billion investment) than it would with
respect to a hypothetical company worth only $10 million but of
which New York owns ninety-nine percent of the stock? Lastly in this
regard, what if the shares are owned only indirectly by the govern-
ment through some other entity, such as its governmental pension
fund? Is such indirect ownership sufficient to render the company a
public entity for purposes of this exception to the dormant Com-
merce Clause?200
Moving away from state ownership of corporate shares, the task of
distinguishing public and private entities becomes even more difficult.
Take, for example, companies that contract with state and local gov-
ernments to provide services to their residents. It seems strange to
view a government contractor as a public entity by virtue of that rela-
tionship, yet the Court's decision in United Haulers offers some sup-
port for this view, thereby clouding the picture. There, the Court
upheld regulatory measures that favored municipally owned waste-
processing facilities.201 What is often overlooked, however, is that one
of the favored processing facilities was actually operated and managed
by a private company pursuant to a contract with the relevant govern-
mental authority.202
United Haulers' endorsement of regulatory favoritism for a facility
"owned" by the municipality but operated by a private contractor
raises the prospect that other government contractors may similarly
be protected under the aegis of the public-entities exception. Sup-
pose that a municipality leases public land to a company, which builds
and operates a plant to produce, say, ethanol. Is the facility "owned"
by the municipality, such that the municipality can adopt regulatory
or tax measures to favor ethanol produced by the company? Must the
available al http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2008/snap
shots/387.html.
200 Cf Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 477 (2003) (holding that, in the
context of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a foreign state's indirect ownership
of majority of shares of private corporation through several intermediate subsidiaries
does not render corporation an instrumentality of the foreign state).
201 See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 345 (2007).
202 See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 261
F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 2001).
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municipality also own the building or the machinery in it in order for
the ethanol to qualify for municipal tax or regulatory favoritism?
Must the workers at the facility be public employees, or can they be
the employees of the private contractor? At what point is the facility
"municipally owned" within the meaning of United Haulers?
And, even more perplexingly, what about government contrac-
tors who do not operate from "municipally owned" facilities but who
provide goods or services to local residents? Prior to United Haulers,
the Court had invalidated regulatory favoritism for a private company
providing public services to municipal residents from a nominally pri-
vate facility,203 but, after United Haulers and Davis, it is unclear why
exactly a municipality must "own" the favored facility. Both United
Haulers and Davis emphasize the need to free state and local govern-
ments from dormant Commerce Clause restraints in the discharge of
"traditional government function [s]."204 On that basis, municipal
ownership of the favored facility seems irrelevant. A municipality
surely discharges its "traditional governmental functions" as much by
contracting with a private entity to provide those services directly to
local residents from a private facility as it does by providing those ser-
vices itself via public employees. Yet, on the other hand, allowing state
and local governments to adopt tax and regulatory measures that
favor private companies merely by entering into a contract with the
company to provide goods or services to local residents on certain
terms runs the risk of licensing widespread protectionism. For exam-
ple, suppose a state government contracts with a private company to
provide gasoline to state residents at a specified price. Could it then
tax other companies' gasoline at a higher rate or ban residents from
purchasing gasoline from other companies? 205 If so, state and local
governments may protect every local business from outside competi-
tion merely by "contracting" with the business to provide goods and
services to local residents on certain terms and then adopting a pro-
tectionist tax or regulation to "assist" the company to perform its
"public service" under the contract. It is to prevent this circumstance
that the "traditional governmental function" test is evidently aimed,
but, as discussed above, 2 06 it is far from clear whether that test is up to
the task.
203 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994).
204 See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1811 (2008); United Haulers, 550
U.S. at 343-44.
205 Cf New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 280 (1988) (invalidating tax
credit for ethanol manufactured in state).
206 See supra Part II.B.
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Or, perhaps furthest afield, take situations in which the govern-
ment provides financial assistance to private companies. Such assis-
tance can come in a variety of forms. Ironically, Davis itself dealt
obliquely with one such mechanism: the economic development or
"private activity" municipal bond.207 State and local governments reg-
ularly issue these types of bonds, the proceeds of which go to private
entities to subsidize economic development in the state or municipal-
ity.208 The bonds are issued in the name of the municipality, but the
debt service payments are typically funded from the revenues received
by the municipality from the benefited private company.209 As one
commentator succinctly put it, such private activity bonds "are essen-
tially corporate bonds."210 Such private activity bonds constitute
roughly one quarter of all municipal bonds issued in the United
States.211
Again, it seems odd to characterize a private company as a public
entity merely by virtue of its receipt of such assistance,212 but Davis
muddies the water even here. In Davis, the Court refused to address a
challenge to the favorable tax treatment for this subset of municipal
bonds on procedural grounds, leaving the question open for resolu-
tion another day.2 13 Yet, the Court also indicated that such private
activity bonds might appropriately be entitled to favorable tax treat-
ment under the public-entities exception: "[W]e cannot tell with cer-
tainty what the consequences would be of holding that Kentucky
violates the Commerce Clause by exempting such bonds; we must
207 See Brief for the National Federation of Municipal Analysts, as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Neither Party at 6, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666), 2007 WL
2115441.
208 See id. at 6-7.
209 See id. at 7 n.3.
210 Michael J. Stutzer, The Statewide Economic Impact of Small-Issue Industrial Revenue
Bonds, FED. REs. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV., Spring 1985, at 2; see alsoJoel Michael,
Kentucky v. Davis: Implications for State Tax Policy and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 45
ST. TAx NoTEs 753, 759 (2007) (noting that "with traditional industrial development
revenue bonds, the bonds are, in all but name, corporate bonds").
211 Brief of Alan D. Viard et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25,
Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2808465. Prior to the federal Tax
Reform Act of 1986, which limited the federal income tax benefit for such private
activity bonds, such bonds comprised sixty-eight percent of all municipal bonds. See
Michael, supra note 210, at 759 & n.51.
212 Cf Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (holding that a private
school that received ninety percent of its funding from the state did not constitute a
state actor).
213 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1805 n.2.
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assume that it could disrupt important projects that the States have
deemed to have public purposes. "214
This seemingly innocuous observation regarding the "public pur-
pose" served by such "private activity" bonds sows the seeds of substan-
tial legal uncertainty. On the one hand, were the Court to hold that
private activity bonds do not qualify for the public-entities exception,
the constitutionality of the tax-exempt status of municipal bonds
would presumably have to turn upon the recipient and use of the pro-
ceeds of the bonds. The Court might be appropriately fearful of
engaging in the difficult task of tracing the proceeds of particular
municipal bonds.215 Moreover, even if some proceeds were easily
traced to a nominally private recipient, there would still remain the
unenviable task of distinguishing between private activity bonds and
"true" municipal bonds, whatever they are. As noted above, state and
local governments often use private companies to perform public ser-
vices for the benefit of residents.2 16 Is there any constitutionally sig-
nificant difference between bonds, the proceeds of which are used by
the municipality to pay a private contractor to build a waste-processing
facility to be operated by the municipality itself, and bonds, the pro-
ceeds of which are given to a private company to build a waste-process-
ing facility to be operated by the company? Is the ownership of the
facility the dispositive factor? And, if so, again, why should that mat-
ter, particularly if the bonds are secured by a mortgage on the facility
(as they typically are in these cases)?
On the other hand, virtually all protectionist tax and regulatory
measures can be defended on the ground that they serve some "public
214 Id.
215 The proceeds of bonds can be deposited either in a segregated fund that is
used for a particular project or in the general fund, which is used to fund legislatively
specified appropriations. One suspects that, were the Court to invalidate discrimina-
tory tax treatment for private activity bonds, states and municipalities might try to
conceal such bonds by depositing all bond proceeds in the general fund and then
providing cash subsidies via appropriation from the general fund to the same private
companies. Cf Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Tax Assessor, 116 F.3d 943, 944-45 (1st
Cir. 1997) (noting that Maine's response to invalidation of a discriminatory milk tax-
and-rebate scheme was to amend statute to provide that milk tax proceeds were
deposited in a general fund, which was then used to fund a subsidy to in-state dairy
farmers). Moreover, further complicating matters (and encouraging such formalist
responses by state and local governments), such direct cash subsidies are assumed by
the Court to raise no dormant Commerce Clause issue. SeeW. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 & n.15 (1994); Williams, supra note 30, at 478-81.
216 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 335 (2007) (noting that private companies were used to "pick up citi-
zens' trash").
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purpose." The "public purpose" ostensibly served by private activity
bonds is to assist private companies expand their operations, which
increases local employment and furthers economic development
within the municipality generally.217 Yet, that is precisely the same
rationale for providing all sorts of discriminatory tax exemptions and
business development incentives to private companies. 21s And, not to
gild the lily, that is precisely the same rationale for imposing tariffs
and other discriminatory regulatory burdens on out-of-state competi-
tors of local companies. 219 If such a public purpose is sufficient to
allow a state to issue tax-favored municipal bonds, the proceeds of
which go to local private companies, surely too it is sufficient to allow
the state to authorize local private companies to issue tax-free bonds
directly. And, surely, then, it is sufficient to allow the state to impose a
tariff on the goods of companies that compete with the local compa-
nies, or perhaps even ban the importation of such competing goods.
In short, treating the public-entities exception as applicable to tax and
regulatory measures that favor private businesses that perform some
"public purpose" as defined by the government opens the door to
myriad protectionist measures.
Several consequences flow from the Court's inability to perceive,
let alone to grapple with, these issues and delineate the scope of the
public-entities exception. First and perhaps most immediately, lower
courts (and ultimately the Court itself) will be forced to address the
precise scope of the public-entities exception and its applicability to
nominally private companies that interact with the government in
ways that muddle the difference between the two. As the foregoing
discussion illustrates, that will be no easy task, for the questions that
United Haulers and Davis necessarily raise-and they raise more ques-
tions than they answer-are truly difficult ones.
The extent of the task before the courts can be more fully per-
ceived by looking to the Court's work in the context of the Eleventh
Amendment and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 220 (FSIA).
Those provisions provide sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court to state and foreign governments, respectively. More impor-
tantly for present purposes, such sovereign immunity extends to
instrumentalities of the state, which includes nominally private enti-
217 See generally Stutzer, supra note 210, at 400-05 (discussing the use and impact
of such bonds).
218 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 400-01 (1984) (invali-
dating tax exemption for companies that expanded in-state operations with regard to
foreign exports).
219 W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 204-05 & n.20.
220 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
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ties under certain circumstances. 221 In short, like the public-entities
exception, these areas of law require the courts to distinguish between
private and public entities.
With respect to both the Eleventh Amendment and FSIA, the
courts have labored to define the circumstances in which a nominally
private corporation qualifies as a public entity for purposes of sover-
eign immunity. In the Eleventh Amendment context, the courts have
eschewed any bright-line rule and instead adopted a multifactor test
to determine whether the entity is an "arm of the state." 222 The FSIA
offers a little more guidance because, by express statutory provision,
all corporations in which a foreign sovereign owns a majority of the
shares qualify as public entities.223 With respect to other private enti-
ties, which may still qualify as an "organ of a foreign State," 224 how-
ever, FSIA offers no guidance. Courts have responded to this
statutory lacuna with a multi-factor inquiry somewhat similar to that
used in the Eleventh Amendment context. 225 As one might expect
with regard to such multifactor inquiries, these "tests" have produced
much confusion in both the Eleventh Amendment and FSIA context
and have led to seemingly contradictory results in individual cases. 226
221 See id. § 1603(b) (2); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 471 (2003).
222 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-31 (1997); Pastrana-
Torres v. Corporacion de P.R. Para la Difusion Publica, 460 F.3d 124, 126-27 (1st Cir.
2006); Aguon v. Commonwealth Ports Auth., 316 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In
the Eleventh Amendment context, we employ a five-factor test to determine whether
an entity is an arm of the state: (1) 'whether a moneyjudgment would be satisfied out
of state funds,' (2) 'whether the entity performs central governmental functions,' (3)
'whether the entity may sue or be sued,' (4) 'whether the entity has the power to take
property in its own name or only the name of the state' and (5) 'the corporate status
of the entity.'" (quoting Mitchell v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir.
1989))).
223 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2).
224 Id.
225 See, e.g., Peninsula Asset Mgmt. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Hankook Tire Co., 476 F.3d
140, 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that test requires analysis of following factors: "'(1)
whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose; (2) whether the
foreign state actively supervises the entity; (3) whether the foreign state requires the
hiring of public employees and pays their salaries; (4) whether the entity holds exclu-
sive rights to some right in the [foreign] country; and (5) how the entity is treated
under foreign state law'" (alteration in original) (quoting Filler v. Hanvitt Bank, 378
F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004))); Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841,
847 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that, while these factors "provide a helpful framework, we
will not apply them mechanically or require that all five support an organ-
determination").
226 Compare Pastrana-Torres, 460 F.3d at 128 (holding that Public Broadcast Corpo-
ration of Puerto Rico is not arm of commonwealth, despite substantial governmental
control), with Villegas Davila v. Pascual, 631 F.Supp. 919, 921-22 (D.P.R. 1986) (hold-
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Indeed, both courts and commentators have bemoaned the absence
of a "clear test."2 2 7 If this is what awaits the courts (and the nation
generally) in the context of the public-entities exception-and we
think it is-there is good reason to be apprehensive that analytical
confusion rather than clarity will be the result.
Second, as the courts struggle to identify the contours of the pub-
lic-entities exception, state and local governments will no doubt
actively seek to exploit the ambiguities in the doctrine. State or local
governments wishing to adopt discriminatory tax or regulatory mea-
sures to favor local companies may seek to purchase a majority owner-
ship in the favored companies. Or, if that is too expensive, maybe
they will enter into 'joint venture" contracts with the favored compa-
nies to provide particular goods or services to local residents, which
contract will denominate the companies' efforts as the provision of
some "public service." Or maybe they will simply authorize the com-
panies to issue tax-free bonds or will exempt their goods or services
from the state sales tax on the ground that the company serves some
"public purpose." The form in which such protectionist maneuvers
manifest themselves will be bounded only by the imagination of state
and local officials.
To be sure, the Court is not oblivious to this possibility, but the
Court dismissed it as both unlikely and remediable by Congress, which
can statutorily prohibit the most egregious forms of state protection-
ism.2 28 We agree that a wholesale nationalization of private industry
by state and local governments is unlikely, but the Court misses the
point that its new rule incentivizes precisely that type of behavior.
Given the numerous efforts throughout American history of state and
local governments seeking to protect local industries from out-of-state
competition, it would be anomalous for state and local governments
not to seek to use the Court's new rule to achieve those forbidden
ends. And, as for Congress being able to step in and prohibit some
forms of such protectionism, again, there is good reason to doubt
Congress's ability and desire to police each and every tax and regula-
ing that corporation was arm of state, despite commonwealth statute expressly provid-
ing that corporation was distinct from commonwealth and that debts of corporation
were not that of commonwealth).
227 See, e.g., Kelly, 213 F.3d at 847; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Refining the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act, 9 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RES. 57, 65 (2001).
228 See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 345 n.7 (2007).
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tory measure adopted by the 89,000 state and local governments in
this nation.229 As Justice Jackson aptly warned:
It is a tempting escape from a difficult question to pass to Congress
the responsibility for continued existence of local restraints and
obstructions to national commerce. But these restraints are individ-
ually too petty, too diversified, and too local to get the attention of a
Congress hard pressed with more urgent matters. The practical
result is that in default of action by us they will go on suffocating
and retarding and Balkanizing American commerce, trade and
industry.230
And, even if Congress does become aware of some local restraint,
the constitutional limits on the legislative process, most notably the
bicameralism and presentment requirements, 231 make congressional
action difficult as a formal matter and therefore unlikely as a practical
matter, at least in the vast run of cases. Finally, as one of us has
pointed out elsewhere, when Congress exercises its affirmative power
under the Commerce Clause, it is at least as apt to countenance dis-
crimination as it is to quash it.232
Third and perhaps most profoundly, even if the courts can elabo-
rate and apply a principled test to distinguish public and private enti-
ties, there is still the underlying issue as to whether it is normatively
desirable to allow state and local governments to favor those entities
that are deemed "public" under whatever test ultimately prevails. Sup-
pose, for example, that the State of Georgia acquires a supermajority
stake in Coca Cola, Inc. Should it therefore be permissible for the
state to provide a tax exemption from the state sale tax on purchases
of Coke on the ground that the state is merely trying to encourage
residents to purchase Coke, thereby ensuring the profitability of Coca
Cola and, correspondingly, the state's investment in the company?
And, if so, what about more salient forms of protectionist tax or regu-
latory measures? Could Georgia impose a punitive tariff on Pepsi and
other cola products imported into the state? Or what about a regula-
tory ban on in-state consumers drinking other colas? Instinctively, we
recoil from the suggestion that these measures would be constitu-
229 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAu, LOCAL GoVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS BY
TYPE AND STATE: 2007 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/govs/cog/GovOrg
Tab03ss.html.
230 Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring in
the result).
231 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-58 (1983) (requiring that all legislative
action satisfy bicameralism and presentment requirements).
232 See Brannon P. Denning, Is the Dormant Commerce Clause Expendable? A Response
to Edward Zelinsky, 77 Miss. L.J. 623, 646-50 (2007).
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tional, but there is nothing in either United Haulers or Davis itself to
give us comfort in that regard.
D. Whither the Dormant Commerce Clause?
Lastly, the Court's embrace of the public-entities exception poses
a subtle, yet profound, threat to current dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. For the past sixty-some years, the Court's dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine has been fairly stable. Although there have
been heated exchanges on the Court regarding the role of the Court
in policing nondiscriminatory taxes and regulations,233 there has been
widespread consensus among the Justices that the Court was acting
appropriately in rooting out and scrutinizing discriminatory taxes or
regulations to ensure that states and municipalities were not attempt-
ing to engage in protectionism.234 Indeed, since the New Deal, only
Justice Thomas (and maybe Justice Black) has called for a wholesale
repudiation of the Court's role in this context.2 3 5
In our view, Davis and, to a lesser extent, United Haulers signal the
fragmentation of this post-New Deal consensus among the Justices.
The Davis majority's ruminations about the need to free state and
local governments from dormant Commerce Clause restrictions
evince both a fear that the current doctrine has inappropriately con-
strained state regulatory and taxation autonomy and, concomitantly, a
skepticism regarding the need for judicial scrutiny of state and local
taxes and regulations.236 Whether or not one agrees with the Court
on these points-and we do not-it is hard to see how these twin
beliefs do not seep into and destabilize other aspects of the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
Take, for example, the Court's apprehension that the dormant
Commerce Clause must not interfere with the state's ability to dis-
charge its "traditional governmental functions." Surely it is a "tradi-
tional governmental function" to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of citizens. Indeed, that is the very definition of the states'
233 See, e.g., infra note 235.
234 See Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S 59, 66-67 (2003); W. Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204-05 (1994); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941,
957-58 (1982); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810-14 (1976).
235 See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1821-22 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 551
n.2 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that he had "acquiesced" in the dormant
Commerce Clause rule against discrimination against interstate commerce, though
he thought there was no dormant Commerce Clause).
236 See, e.g., Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810-11; id. at 1821 (Scalia,J., concurring in part);
id. at 1822 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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police power. And, equally surely, a state protects the welfare of its
citizens by encouraging employment in the community. Yet, on that
ground, it is very much unclear why a state or local government
should not be able to adopt patently protectionist taxes or regulations
to protect private companies from out-of-state competition (and
thereby promote local employment). The state discharges its tradi-
tional governmental function as much by imposing a tariff on the
goods of companies outside the state (so as to encourage local pro-
duction) as it does by nationalizing a local producer and then, as
Davis and United Haulers expressly endorse,237 adopting a discrimina-
tory tax or regulation to protect the now-public company from outside
competition. Stated differently, if the latter measure can be defended
on the ground that the state is discharging its traditional government
functions, so too can the former. Of course, that line of analysis swal-
lows the dormant Commerce Clause itself.238
Or take the Court's faith that Congress can better or more appro-
priately address any disruption in interstate trade created by state and
local regulations or taxes. Once again, that view cannot be cabined to
the public-entities exception. True, as the Court observed, Congress
can forbid states from nationalizing all fast-food hamburger stands or
imposing protectionist tariffs or regulations to promote publicly
owned hamburger stands, 239 but the same is true with regard to pro-
tectionist regulations or tariffs on other out-of-state goods, such as eth-
anol, milk, or solid waste. Yet, for close to two centuries, Congress's
formal authority to regulate interstate commerce has not been under-
stood as removing the need for or legitimacy ofjudicial review of state
and local measures that may undermine the national common
market.240
Our point is not that the Court has overstated the dormant Com-
merce Clause's impact on state autonomy or overestimated Congress's
ability to protect interstate trade-though we do believe that to be the
case-rather, it's that the Court's line of analysis applies across-the-
board to all facets of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. It does
not merely justify the public-entities exception to the antidiscrimina-
tion principle; it arguably invites a wholesale reappraisal of other,
widely accepted features of that doctrine, such as the ban on protec-
tionist taxes and regulations that favor purely private businesses. In
237 See id. at 1813-18 (majority opinion); United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 343-47 (2007).
238 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
239 See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 345 n.7.
240 See Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1990).
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that respect, the final implication arising from these cases may be
their most revolutionary. United Haulers and Davis may not simply
license public protectionism; they may turn out to be the first salvo in
a more profound reassessment and recalibration of dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine-one that narrows substantially (or maybe
even eliminates) the scope of judicial protection for the American
common market. The New Protectionism and the Old could very eas-
ily merge-all but eliminating the judicial role created by the dor-
mant Commerce Clause nearly two centuries ago.
IV. THE NEW PROTECTIONISM AND THE
MARKET-PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION
Alternatively (and more surprisingly), three Justices in Davis
sought tojustify the Court's embrace of public protectionism by invok-
ing the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause. 241 As we explain in this section, however, the plurality's effort
to situate public protectionism within the market-participant excep-
tion rests on a misguided, overly broad interpretation of that excep-
tion. Worse, were the plurality's capacious conception of the doctrine
accepted by the Court, it would represent a substantial expansion of
the exception-so substantial, in fact, that such an "exception" would
come perilously close to swallowing the antidiscrimination principle
itself.
A. Summary of the Market-Participant Exception
State governments are exempt from the dormant Commerce
Clause when acting not as market regulators (such as when they use
their tax or regulatory powers) but as market participants (such as
when they use their spending or purchasing authority).242 Thus, for
241 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811-17 (reflecting that Justices Breyer and Stevens
joined Justice Souter's market-participant exception and all other Justices disagreed
with its reasoning); Coenen, The Supreme Court's Municipal Bond Decision, supra note 8
(manuscript at 10) (terming the plurality's recharacterization, in Davis, of United
Haulers as a market-participant case "a radically revisionist treatment of the decision").
242 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810-14 (1976) (upholding
state program to encourage recycling of abandoned automobiles, where paperwork
requirements on out-of-state scrap processors were more onerous than those imposed
on in-state competitors); see also White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460
U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983) (upholding executive order requiring city residents to com-
pose one-half of work force on all city-funded or -administered construction projects).
For scholarly commentary on the exception, see BoRis 1. BrrITKER, BYTrKER ON THE
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE §§ 7.01-7.07 (Brannon P. Den-
ning ed., 1999 & 2008 Supp.); Coenen, supra note 28; Williams, supra note 30.
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example, a state may decide to sell cement from a state-owned cement
plant only to state residents. 243 Likewise, a state may choose to
purchase printing services or supplies for its own use from in-state
companies. 244
Acknowledging that states could use the "market-participant
exception" to undermine the national common market, the Court
limited the scope of this exception in two significant ways. First, states
may not use their market power in one market to regulate the behav-
ior of private individuals outside that market. In South-Central Timber
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,245 the State of Alaska sold timber subject
to the contractual proviso that, prior to export, the timber be
processed in the state, so as to benefit the local timber-processing
industry.246 A plurality of the Court invalidated the restriction on the
ground that a state may not use its market power to exert influence
over the disposition of property after a sale has been completed. In
the plurality's view, state efforts to control the subsequent disposition
of state-sold goods or services smacked more of regulation than of
participation, since ordinarily sellers of goods don't care what buyers
do with those goods after the sale.24 7 "The State," the plurality wrote,
''may not impose conditions . . . that have a substantial regulatory
effect outside of [a] particular market."24 8 Because the market in
which Alaska was participating was the timber-sale market, not the tim-
ber-processing market, Alaska's timber-processing export restriction
was a "downstream restriction[ ]" with regulatory effects.249 A major-
ity of the Court has subsequently embraced the South-Central Timber
limitation on the market-participant exception. 250
243 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446-47 (1980).
244 The market-participant doctrine is of a piece with the assumed exception to
the dormant Commerce Clause for discriminatory cash subsidies. See, e.g., New
Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) ("Direct subsidization of domestic
industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the dormant Commerce Clause] . . . .").
But cf W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994) ("We have
never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not do so
now."). See generally Coenen, supra note 30 (exploring the constitutionality of, and
creating an analytic structure for, business subsidies after West Lynn Creamery).
245 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
246 See id. at 85.
247 See id. at 97-98 (plurality opinion).
248 Id. at 97.
249 Id. at 99.
250 See, e.g., Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 65-66 (2003) (preventing
state from regulating milk prices in connection with its regulation of labeling and
composition of milk); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 403
(1994) (O'Connor,J., concurring) (listing cases where the Court has embraced such
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Second, a state does not "participate" in a market within the
meaning of the exception by taxing either entities that do not deal
with the government or, relatedly, transactions to which the govern-
ment is not a party. In New Energy Co. v. Limbach, for example, the
Court invalidated Ohio's state fuel tax credit offered for sales of etha-
nol produced in state.251 Rejecting the state's contention that the tax
credit was simply a form of market participation, the Court concluded
that the market-participant exception did not apply because the state
was neither purchasing nor selling ethanol. Rather, in the Court's
view, the state's action involved the "assessment and computation of
taxes-a primeval governmental activity." 252 Likewise, in Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
2 53 the Court held that a
property tax exemption for charitable institutions serving in-state citi-
zens was not a form of market participation (i.e., the state was not
purchasing charitable services for its citizens via the tax exemption)
but rather an impermissible tariff on charities that served out-of-state
citizens.254
B. Davis's Market-Participant Revisionism
The Court in United Haulers did not suggest, let alone hold, that
the county solid waste flow-control ordinances fit within the market-
participant exception. In Davis, though, a plurality sought to cast the
public-entities exception as simply an extension or outgrowth of the
market-participant exception. Kentucky's imposition of a tax on out-
of-state municipal bonds, the plurality argued, "may also be seen
under the broader rubric of the market participation doctrine"
because, according to the plurality, Kentucky "has entered the market
for debt securities."255 To be sure, the plurality acknowledged that
taxes are typically an example of state market regulation outside the
a limitation); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992) (declining to extend
state ratemaking authority to related areas of regulation).
251 See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 280 (1988). The Ohio statute
also extended its tax credit to ethanol produced in other states that granted a similar
credit for Ohio-produced ethanol. As the Court has long made clear, however, such
reciprocal tax or regulatory favoritism is discriminatory and subject to strict judicial
scrutiny. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982); Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-81 (1976).
252 New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 277.
253 520 U.S. 564 (1997)
254 Id. at 594 ("Maine's tax exemption ... must be viewed as action taken in the
State's sovereign capacity rather than a proprietary decision to make an entry into all
of the markets in which the exempted charities function.").
255 Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1811-12 (2008).
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scope of the exception, but the plurality dismissed the significance of
that fact on the ground that Kentucky was "act[ing] in two roles at
once, issuing bonds and setting taxes."25 6 For the plurality, attempt-
ing to separate those roles "blinks this reality" by "pretend [ing] that in
exempting the income from its securities, Kentucky is independently
regulating or regulating in the garden variety way that has made a
State vulnerable to the dormant Commerce Clause."257 In short, the
plurality was suggesting that taxes and regulations designed to pro-
mote governmental operations-that is, public protectionism-fit
within the exception so long as the taxes or regulations were related
in some, unspecified manner to some underlying market participation
by the state (in this case, the issuance of municipal bonds).
In our view, the plurality's attempt to conjoin classic regulatory or
tax measures with state spending or purchasing acts reflects a pro-
foundly misguided understanding of the scope of the market-partici-
pant exception and the basis for that exception in the dormant
Commerce Clause. As the Court has historically understood, a state
participates in a market (in the meaning of this exception) by provid-
ing state-created or -financed goods or services to state residents on
preferential terms.2 58 A state may seek to limit the benefits of state-
created goods and services to state residents, who were the ones who
paid the taxes to subsidize their creation in the first place. Thus, for
example, had Oneida and Herkimer counties merely refused to pro-
vide garbage-processing services to out-of-state waste or had Kentucky
merely refused to sell its municipal bonds to outsiders, the exception
would properly insulate such preferential distribution of government-
owned resources from constitutional challenge. In contrast, regula-
tory measures requiring residents to purchase the government-owned
goods or services (as in United Haulers) and taxes penalizing those who
fail to purchasc the government-owned goods or services (as in Davis)
are manifestly outside the exception. Once it mandates that residents
deal only with it or taxes more heavily those who refuse to do so, it is
no longer participating in the market; it is trying to shape the market
to its benefit.
The plurality's failure to grasp this basic distinction between mar-
ket regulation and market participation is reflected in its inability to
identify a single case in which the Court has upheld a regulatory or
tax measure of this sort. Indeed, the foundational decisions uphold-
ing state preferences for local residents under this exception-Hughes
256 Id. at 1812.
257 Id.
258 See id. at 1808-10.
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v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,259 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,260 and White v. Massa-
chusetts Council of Construction Employers261-all involved governmental
measures that channeled government resources to local residents.
Thus, in Alexandria Scrap, the Court upheld a preferential subsidy to
in-state automobile hulk processors; it did not uphold a regulation
requiring local residents to use in-state processors or a tax on those
who refused to do so. 262 In Reeves, the Court upheld a state's refusal
to sell cement from the state-owned plant to nonresidents; it did not
uphold a regulation requiring local residents purchase cement from
the state plant or a tax on those who purchased their cement from out
of state.263 And in White, the Court upheld a city requirement that
contractors working on city-financed public work construction
projects use a certain percentage of local workers; it did not uphold a
regulation requiring contractors on other projects to use local
residents or a tax on those who employed out-of-state workers on
projects financed by private companies or other municipal instrumen-
talities. 264 At the same time, the Court has uniformly refused to apply
the market-participant exception to regulations and taxes that favor
in-state economic activity. 265
Despite the clarity of these holdings, the plurality creatively rein-
terprets the Court's decisions to eviscerate that fundamental distinc-
tion between market regulation and market participation. According
to the plurality, the Court's prior cases applying the exception actually
did validate regulatory measures, albeit ones linked to some other
form of market participation by the state. For the plurality, in cases
like White and Alexandria Scrap:
[T]he commercial activities by the governments and their regula-
tory efforts complemented each other in some way, and in each of
them the fact of tying the regulation to the public object of the
foray into the market was understood to give the regulation a civic
objective different from the discrimination traditionally held to be
unlawful: in the paradigm of unconstitutional discrimination the
law chills interstate activity by creating a commercial advantage for
goods or services marketed by local private actors, not by govern-
ments and those they employ to fulfill their civic objectives .... 266
259 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
260 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
261 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
262 See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 812-14.
263 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 443-47.
264 See White, 460 U.S. at 214-15.
265 See, e.g., New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1988).
266 Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1813-14 (2008).
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Meanwhile, according to the plurality, those cases rejecting the
applicability of the exception did not involve taxes or regulations con-
joined to some other form of market participation. Thus, the plural-
ity distinguished the tax exemption invalidated in Camps Newfound on
the ground that there "the tax exemption was unaccompanied by any
market activity by the State; it favored only private charitable institu-
tions."267 And South-Central Timber was distinguishable not only
because it involved "'foreign commerce,"' which the plurality claimed
brought on "'more rigorous' Commerce Clause scrutiny," but because
it involved post-sale restrictions on goods in private hands.2 6 8
In our view, the plurality's attempt to situate public protectionism
within the ambit of the market-participant exception is utterly tenden-
tious. None of the Court's decisions ever hinted, much less held, that
the determination that tax and regulatory measures were not market
participation depended upon the nature of the beneficiary (public or
private).*269 Nor does it make any sense to treat taxes or regulations
that favor government operations as a form of market participation.
To the contrary, conflating the two forms of state action as the
plurality does swallows the rule against protectionism because all state
regulation and taxation can be tied to some state participation some-
where. In New Energy, for example, the state was surely purchasing gas
and ethanol for state-owned car fleets; on the plurality's approach, the
ethanol tariff would be perfectly constitutional on the ground that the
tariff fosters local production of ethanol for purchase by the state for
its fleet. Similarly, in Camps Newfound, the State of Maine was partici-
pating in the market for charitable services for its citizens-that was
why it offered the tax exemption in the first place-yet, that was not
sufficient to bring the discriminatory tax within the ambit of the
exception. 270
267 Id. at 1814 n.17.
268 Id. (quoting S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984)).
269 In particular, it seems preposterous to argue (as the plurality does) that United
Haulers could be explained as resting on this ground. The Court in United Haulers
said no such thing-and for good reason: the county was not trying to induce
residents to use the municipally owned processing facilities through some financial
incentive; it was mandating it. Unlike the counties, private companies lack the ability
to force consumers to purchase services from a single supplier-at least not without
drawing the attention of the Department ofJustice. The counties' waste flow-control
ordinances were manifestly regulatory in nature, which is why Oneida and Herkimer
Counties abandoned their market-participant exception argument. Cf United Haul-
ers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 363-64 (2007)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
270 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
593-95 (1997).
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To say that Maine or Ohio's exemption benefited only private
parties-as the plurality does to distinguish both from Davis-engages
in the same sort of disaggregation of participation and regulation that
the plurality condemns. Neither Alaska, Ohio, nor Maine seemed
intent on enacting naked preferences in favor of local, private busi-
nesses or to hobble their out-of-state competitors with ruinous taxes.
Rather, they sought to stimulate production of a certain type of public
good-jobs,21 charity,2 7 2 and alternative fuels.2 7 3 Why the recipients
of those exemptions could not be viewed as "those [the government]
employ [s] to fulfill their civic objectives" 274 is not readily apparent.
One might easily view beneficiaries of the tax exemptions in New
Energy and Camps Newfound-as the plurality obviously views the pri-
vate contractors and subcontractors in White--as "employees" of the
State whose tax exemptions are intended to grow the market for chari-
table services or for locally produced ethanol through the use of its
tax code.275 Conversely, to say that only public entities benefited from
the tax exemption makes the same framing error: private parties-
those who bought the bonds-did benefit vis-di-vis those parties who
bought private or out-of-state income-producing bonds. In short, any
and all taxes and regulations, no matter how protectionist, are consti-
tutional on this theory.
More fundamentally, the Court's market-participant cases depend
on the ability to disaggregate (and distinguish) the participatory and
regulatory activities of the state. In prior cases the Court certainly
assumed that participation and regulation could be distinguished-
indeed, had to be distinguished, if the market-participant exception
was to be cabined. 276 The exception itself was born of a desire to per-
271 See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 85 (1984).
272 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 568.
273 See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271 (1988).
274 Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1814 (2008).
275 See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 220-21 (1983).
276 See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 592-93 (stating that the
Court's cases "stand for the proposition that, for purposes of analysis under the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, a State acting in its proprietary capacity as a purchaser or
seller may 'favor its own citizens over others'" (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976))); Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 93 ("Our cases make clear
that if a State is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator, the
dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities."); White, 460 U.S. at
208 (reading Reeves and Alexandria Scrap as standing "for the proposition that when a
state or local government enters the market as a participant it is not subject to the
restraints of the Commerce Clause"); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37
(1980) (characterizing Alexandfia Scrap as turning on the characterization of the State
as a participant, not as a regulator; endorsing the distinction as "mak[ing] good sense
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mit states freedom and autonomy to distribute certain benefits to
their citizens without having to share with everyone.277 The rough-
and-ready rule the Court devised was one that permitted the strictures
of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to be relaxed where the
State was buying or selling on its own account.278 But the Court was
emphatic that wherever the shadowlands between regulation and par-
ticipation lie, distribution of benefits via a state's tax code fell squarely
on the "regulation" side of the boundary.279
C. The Implications of an Expanded Market-Participant Exception
The plurality's disregard of the Court's traditional presumption
that the use of the taxing power is paradigmatically regulatory (not
participatory) and, more generally, its conflation of market participa-
tion and regulation would mean that instead of a limited exception to
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the market-participant
exception would likely be the doctrine's undoing.
and sound law"; and arguing that "[t] here is no indication of a constitutional plan to
limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market").
277 As Larry Tribe put it, "Central heating is a marvelous thing, but it makes little
sense in a house without walls." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
1095 (3d ed. 2000).
278 See New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 277. Dan Coenen shares our concerns, writing
that Justice Souter's argument posed three dangers to the market-participant
exception:
First, that analysis involves a deeply problematic recrafting of the basic rheto-
ric of market-participant analysis. Second, there exists a serious risk that this
new rhetoric will reshape dormant Commerce Clause decisionmaking in
undesirable ways. Third, an embrace ofJustice Souter's methodology would
at least inject new and far-reaching doctrinal uncertainties into this field of
law.
Coenen, The Supreme Court's Municipal Bond Decision, supra note 8 (manuscript at
15-16).
279 See New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 277 (holding that simply because a discrimina-
tory tax subsidy "has the purpose and effect of subsidizing a particular industry" it
does not therefore become "a form of state participation in the free market"); id. at
278 ("Ohio's assessment and computation of its fuel sales tax, regardless of whether it
produces a subsidy, cannot plausibly be analogized to the activity of a private pur-
chaser."); see also Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Taxation is a
quintessential act of regulation, not market participation."); Camps Newfound/
Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 593 ("A tax exemption is not the sort of direct state involve-
ment in the market that falls within the market-participation doctrine."); id. at 594
("Maine's tax exemption-which sweeps to cover broad swathes of the nonprofit sec-
tor-must be viewed as action taken in the State's sovereign capacity rather than a
proprietary decision to make an entry into all of the markets in which the exempted
charities function.").
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To illustrate the implications of the plurality's theory, imagine
State A produces a type of widget from local materials. The widget
competes against other states' widgets, and the materials from which
State A's widget is produced make it slightly less desirable than those
produced out of state. Assume further that State A imposes a whole-
sale tax on widget sales within the state. In order to stimulate sales of
the local widgets, prop up the local widget industry, and improve its
competitiveness vis-1-vis out-of-state producers, State A exempts its
locally produced widgets from that tax. The out-of-state widget manu-
facturers sue, claiming a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Under current law, a reviewing court would apply strict scrutiny
to such a facially discriminatory exemption. The market-participant
exemption would be unavailable because the law at issue is a tax
exemption. That State A intended to benefit in-state producers rather
than burden those from out of state is irrelevant under current doc-
trine, because protectionist means, as well as ends, are treated the
same.
Were the plurality's theory to become the law, though, State A
would have a colorable argument that the market-participant doctrine
applies. Sure, a court might say, State A is regulating the widget mar-
ket through the use of its tax code, but the Davis plurality's rejection
of other Courts' categorical exclusion of "primeval governmental
activities" like tax would not end the inquiry. The state could argue
that its use of the taxing power was a form of participation in the
market for locally produced widgets, since it used those exemptions to
stimulate their production. Economic development, moreover, is
surely a "traditional governmental function." And while private indus-
tries benefited from the exemption, there are public benefits as well-
increased demand enables workers to keep their jobs and pay taxes,
which enriches State A and indirectly benefits other citizens who
depend on revenue from those taxes for myriad services.
These arguments are not new. State and local governments have
made them before in an attempt to preserve protectionist laws. In
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,280 for example, a case with essentially the
same facts as the opening hypothetical, Hawaii sought to defend a tax
exemption for locally produced liquor and wine by claiming the
exemption was intended to aid in-state producers, as opposed to dis-
criminating against out-of-state producers. 281
The Court conceded that "a State may enact laws pursuant to its
police powers that have the purpose and effect of encouraging domes-
280 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
281 See id. at 271.
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tic industry."28 2 But it stressed that "the Commerce Clause stands as a
limitation on the means by which a State can constitutionally seek to
achieve that goal." 2 8 3 Thus, it was of no significance that Hawaii's pur-
pose was to aid a particular industry: "the propriety of economic pro-
tectionism may not be allowed to hinge upon the State's-or this
Court's-characterization of the industry as either 'thriving' or 'strug-
gling.' "284 Nor was the Court persuaded by Hawaii's argument that its
intent was to aid its local producers:
If we were to accept that justification, we would have little occasion
ever to find a statute unconstitutionally discriminatory. Virtually
every discriminatory statute .. . can be viewed as conferring a bene-
fit on one party and a detriment on the other, in either an absolute
or relative sense. The determination of constitutionality does not
depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the bur-
dened party. . . . [I]t could always be said that there was no intent
to impose a burden on one party, but rather the intent was to con-
fer a benefit on the other. Consequently, it is irrelevant to the Com-
merce Clause inquiry that the motivation of the legislature was the
desire to aid the makers of the locally produced beverage rather
than to harm out-of-state producers.2 8 5
This strikes us as indisputably correct. But such sensible rules
would be thrown to the winds by the Davis plurality's expansion of the
market-participant doctrine. Thereafter courts would inevitably be
thrown back on questions of motive, beneficiaries, and the regulatory
or participatory nature of particular regulations. As was true of
Hawaii's arguments in Bacchus Imports, such questions could easily
make it all but impossible for plaintiffs to prevail in dormant Com-
merce Clause cases, since nearly every law could conceivably fall under
the plurality's conception of the market-participant "exception."
We take comfort in the fact that only two other members of the
Court endorsed Justice Souter's market-participant revisionism. But
given the capaciousness of the public-entities exception, described
above, we fear that the dormant Commerce Clause is still in considera-
ble peril. As we discuss in the next section, the Court's-and a major-
ity of the Court at that-profound skepticism about the future of Pike
balancing leaves us even more certain that the dormant Commerce
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 273.
285 Id.
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Clause doctrine will undergo significant alteration under the Roberts
Court.
V. THE TWILIGHT OF PKE BALANCING
The third notable feature of the Davis opinion is its skeptical atti-
tude towards balancing. To be sure, balancing has always had its crit-
ics, notably Justices Scalia and Thomas. And balancing has not done
all that much work during the Rehnquist Court. By our count, a
majority of the Court has not invalidated a law using Pike balancing in
over twenty years,286 though it is not unheard of for lower courts to do
so. As recently as last year, the Court-though in a rather desultory
fashion-applied Pike balancing in United Haulers.287 But Davis fur-
ther diluted United Haulers' rather tepid application of Pike to the
point of abnegation, calling into question the future viability of bal-
ancing as a feature of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.288
Many see Pike as a useful check on burdensome, yet ostensibly nondis-
criminatory regulations, especially of nationwide networks where the
possibility exists of interstate actors being subjected to multiple, con-
flicting regulatory regimes. Donald Regan, moreover, argued that bal-
ancing in fact sought out subtle, well-disguised forms of
protectionism. 289 Therefore, Davis's near-disavowal of Pike balancing
presents a third facet of the Court's dilution of the dormant Com-
merce Clause and its further embrace of the New Protectionism.
A. Davis on Balancing
The Court initially asserted that Pike's applicability in cases like
Davis-that is, where the antidiscrimination principle is held inappli-
286 The last case to do so appears to be Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46
(1982).
287 See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 345-47 (2007). Dan Coenen views the willingness of the Court to apply
balancing in United Haulers as an ameliorating feature of what he calls the "state-self-
promotion exception." Coenen, United Haulers, supra note 8 (manuscript at 27)
("The key point is that the state-self-promotion 'exception' provides an exception
only to the antidiscrimination component of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
It does not provide a wholesale exception that negates dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny altogether.").
288 See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1818-20 (2008); see also Coenen,
United Haulers, supra note 8 (manuscript at 28) ("But wait again! In Davis, the Court
identified a new and potentially sweeping limit on the operation of Pike balancing
analysis" by questioning the institutional capacity of courts to weigh benefits and bur-
dens (footnote omitted)).
289 See Regan, supra note 5, at 1105-07.
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cable-is an "an open question" noting that Pike is not usually applied
when the market-participant exception is successfully invoked.2 9 0
Assuming that it waS2 9 1 available, the Court then voiced doubts that,
based on "the current record and scholarly material, ... the Judicial
Branch is not institutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions of the
kind that would be necessary for the Davises to satisfy a Pike
burden."29 2
The majority quoted the Davises' brief on the alleged burdens to
interstate commerce:
"First, it harms out-of-state issuers (i.e., other States and their subdi-
visions) by blocking their access to investment dollars in Kentucky.
Second, it similarly harms out-of-state private sellers (e.g., underwrit-
ers, individuals, and investment funds) who wish to sell their bonds
in Kentucky. Third, it harms the national municipal bond market
and its participants by distorting and impeding the free flow of capi-
tal. Fourth, it harms Kentucky investors by promoting risky, high-
cost investment vehicles. Fifth, it harms the States by compelling
them to enact competing discriminatory laws that decrease their net
revenues."2 93
The Court then observed that "weighing or quantifying [the alleged
harms] for a cost-benefit analysis would be a very subtle exercise."29 4
Referring to possible benefits of the taxing scheme (e.g., facilitating
the borrowing of small towns), the Court asked, "Is any court in a
position to evaluate the advantage of the current market for bonds
issued by the smaller municipalities, the ones with no ready access to
any other bond market than single-state funds?"2 9 5 A veritable cas-
cade of rhetorical questions followed,29 6 and concluded with this
observation:
What is most significant about these cost-benefit questions is not
even the difficulty of answering them or the inevitable uncertainty
290 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817. Justice Souter might have added that Pike balanc-
ing is not a feature of the Complete Auto test, which assesses the validity of state and
local taxes under the dormant Commerce Clause. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). While Davis does concern a tax exemption, the Court
treats it more like a non-tax regulation. In any event, the antidiscrimination principle
is a feature of the Complete Auto test.
291 Justice Souter added that "Kentucky ha[d] not argued that Pike is irrelevant."
Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 1817-18 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 9, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1817 (No.
06-666)).
294 Id. at 1818.
295 Id.
296 See id.
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of the predictions that might be made in trying to come up with
answers, but the unsuitability of the judicial process and judicial forums for
making whatever predictions and reaching whatever answers are possible at
all.297
Surely Justices Scalia and Thomas smiled broadly when they read
those lines.
In the end, there was no question that the Davises didn't demon-
strate the burdens "clearly exceeded" the local benefits. But the
majority went further, suggesting that failure to satisfy the standard
was almost beside the point: courts could neither make such assess-
ments, nor really even ought to try.298
B. The End of Balancing? Four Readings of Davis
There are four possible ways in which to interpret the Court's
moves in United Haulers and Davis. First and most minimally, one
might view the repudiation of Pike in Davis as confined to the facts of
that case. In the Court's view, it was difficult, if not impossible, to
quantify and evaluate the Kentucky measure's costs to out-of-state
municipal bond issuers and the corresponding benefits to local issu-
ers.299 Given those doubts, perhaps Davis presented too close a case
on the merits for the Court to feel comfortable in invalidating munici-
pal bond favoritism. On this view, Pike incorporates a neo-Thayeristic
deference to state authority such that only in clear cases in which the
costs vastly exceed the benefits of a measure will the Court inter-
vene.3 00 So viewed, the judicial review of nondiscriminatory measures
is not illegitimate but rather is only broadly deferential to state author-
ity. There is some support in Davis for this limited reading.301 The
problem with it, however, is that the Court also expressly pointed to
"the unsuitability of the judicial process and judicial forums for mak-
ing whatever predictions and reaching whatever answers are possible
at all" as required by Pike.302 That is a condemnation of Pike that
applies more broadly than just to municipal bond favoritism.
297 Id. (emphasis added).
298 See id. at 1818-20.
299 See id. at 1818.
300 Cf James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 139-52 (1893) (arguing that courts should invalidate mea-
sures only when unconstitutionality is clear).
301 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817 ("[Tlhe current record and scholarly material
convince us that the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw reliable con-
clusions of the kind that would be necessary for the Davises to satisfy a Pike burden in
this particular case." (emphasis added)).
302 Id. at 1818.
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Second, one might read Davis as rejecting balancing only in the
context of state taxes but not state regulations. This reading has the
benefit of reconciling the tension between Davis, which refused to
apply Pike to a state tax, and United Haulers, which applied Pike to a
local regulation. Moreover, there is some normative justification for
rejecting Pike in such cases. Nondiscriminatory taxes are typically sub-
ject to judicial review under the Complete Auto test, which eschews bal-
ancing and instead focuses on whether the tax is jurisdictionally
limited and fairly apportioned so as to avoid the double taxation of
interstate commerce.
In contrast, because of the difficulty of assessing the costs and
economic incidence of a given tax and because state and local govern-
ments have an undoubtedly legitimate interest in (and need for) reve-
nue, the weight of which interest courts might be loathe to question,
courts might be duly wary of balancing the costs and benefits of tax
measures. Indeed, the Court has never expressly applied Pike to a
state tax,303 and the Court in Davis itself hinted that its condemnation
of balancing was limited to taxes. 3 0 4 On this reading, nondiscrimina-
tory state and local regulations are still appropriately subject to Pike
balancing.305 The problem with this view, however, is that, again, the
Court did not expressly invoke it in rejecting Pike's applicability to the
Kentucky municipal bond tax. Indeed, the fact that the Court did not
apply Complete Auto to the Kentucky municipal bond tax in Davis, as
this interpretation would suggest, is some evidence that the Court's
concern about the judicial review of nondiscriminatory taxes is more
global still.306
Third, one might read Davis as rejecting the applicability of Pike
to instances of public protectionism. Indeed, the Court in Davis
hinted at this view, virtually inviting future challenges to Pike on this
ground.307 On this view, Pike remains applicable to nondiscriminatory
regulations (and maybe taxes) that favor private entities. The prob-
lem with this approach, however, is that it is not clear why Pike should
303 Mark L. Mosley, The Path out of the Quagmire: A Better Standard for Assessing State
and Local Taxes Under the Negative Commerce Clause, 58 TAx LAW. 729, 739 (2005).
304 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1818-19.
305 One of us believes that this is the normatively correct approach to the review of
nondiscriminatory taxes.
306 In one of our views, that is not fatal to this interpretation. The litigants had
not sought such review, and, more importantly, the Kentucky measure so clearly satis-
fied Complete Auto that there was no point in the Court expressly subjecting the mea-
sure to such review.
307 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817 (calling the applicability an "open question" and
noting that market-participant cases do not engage in Pike analysis once the exception
is deemed to apply).
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be jettisoned only with respect to public protectionism. If the under-
lying concern (as the Court has indicated) is that balancing embroils
the judiciary in tasks for which it is institutionally ill suited or illegiti-
mate to perform, that concern surely applies across the board to the
judicial review of all state and local measures under Pike. Stated dif-
ferently, there is no a priori justification for drawing the line where
the Court does.
Fourth and most globally, one might read Davis as endorsing the
wholesale repudiation of the judicial review of nondiscriminatory
measures. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia endorsed this view and
criticized the majority for refusing to abjure balancing in all cases as a
pusillanimous half-measure. "The problem is," he wrote, "that courts
are less well suited than Congress to perform this kind of balancing in
every case. The burdens and the benefits are always incommensurate,
and cannot be placed on the opposite balances of a scale without
assigning a policy-based weight to each of them."308 Moreover,
despite Justice Scalia's charge, the Court did not explicitly disagree
with him or otherwise make clear that balancing was appropriate in
other types of cases.
On this view, Davis marks the deathknell of Pike balancing. To be
sure, it has been a long time since a majority of the Supreme Court
has invalidated a state or local law as violating Pike balancing.309 Even
when the Court was willing to wield Pike, there were credible claims
made that the Court was really policing discrimination and protec-
tionism, as opposed to balancing burdens and benefits.3 10 While
lower courts occasionally strike down laws whose burdens on interstate
commerce judges deem excessive relative to their benefits, these are
the exceptions that prove the rule that laws almost always survive.
Among these cases, there are a few whose outcomes seem driven by
lingering suspicion that the laws' facial neutrality masks protectionist
purposes, effects, or both.3 1 1 In other cases, laws invalidated under
308 Id. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
309 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
310 See Regan, supra note 5, at 1212-20.
311 See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim's Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560,
570-74 (4th Cir. 2005) (striking down provision of Virginia franchise law); PSINET,
Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 239-47 (4th Cir. 2004) (striking down Virginia
Internet statute); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 346 F.3d 851, 871
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that California train safety rules on interstate commerce are
a "clearly excessive" burden when compared to local benefits); Fla. Transp. Serv., Inc.
v. Miami-Dade County, 343 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1333-34 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (finding that
stevedore permitting scheme in operation protected entrenched groups of stevedores
and prevented award of permits to new companies and thus imposed an "undue bur-
den" on interstate commerce).
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the antidiscrimination principle are also found to fail Pike balanc-
ing-a belts and suspenders approach, presumably.312 Given this real-
ity, the debate regarding the continuing vitality of Pike might be
viewed as much ado about nothing.
C. Against Premature Abandonment of Balancing
And yet, to repudiate Pike is to jettison an element of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause with deep roots. The Pike balancing test is an
outgrowth of the Cooley Court's attempt to separate permissible from
impermissible state laws regulating interstate commerce, which gave
rise to the distinction between "national" and "local" subjects.3 1 3 Una-
ble to articulate criteria for distinguishing between those subjects, the
Court employed "direct" and "indirect" effects as proxies. 314 justice
Stone urged the Court to replace those conclusory labels with a frank
assessment of benefits and burdens, which the Court eventually did.3 15
Since then, the Court has applied Pike in numerous cases. Indeed,
the Court itself applied Pike just two years ago in United Haulers.3 16
Consequently, at the very least, stare decisis demands that the Court
bear its burden to show either that it was a mistake to adopt balancing
in the first place, that balancing in the dormant Commerce Clause has
become unworkable, or both.3 1 7
As a historical matter, the Court was surely not wrong to adopt a
balancing test when it did so in the 1930s. At the time, balancing was
clearly superior to the indeterminate-to-the-point-of-capricious direct/
indirect test, which preceded it. As its proponents argued, balancing
introduced some transparency into what the judges and commenta-
312 See, e.g., Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1281,
1292-94 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (concluding that formula retail ordinance failed Pike balanc-
ing as well as heightened scrutiny).
313 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (distinguish-
ing national and local subjects).
314 See Denning, supra note 4, at 437-40 (discussing the rise of the direct/indirect
test); see also Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67
U. CHI. L. REv. 1089, 1146-48 (2000) (discussing ChiefJustice Stone's criticism of the
direct/indirect test as "'too mechanical'" (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362
(1943))).
315 See Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting); see
also So. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783-84 (1945) (adopting balancing); S.C.
State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189-90 (1938) (using the terms
"burden" and "benefit").
316 See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 346-47 (2007).
317 Cf Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (joint
op.) (discussing factors in deciding whether to overrule precedent).
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tors of the time saw as the policy choices judges inevitably made.
Moreover, balancing tests are still the stock-in-trade of constitutional
courts around the world, even as they have shrunk in importance in
the United States. As for being unworkable, it is not clear that the
Court is required, under Pike, to balance "incommensurables" any
more than when, for example, it engages in "hard look" review under
the Administrative Procedure Act318 or when it must balance the
rights of individuals generally against the interests of society and its
orderly governance.3 19
In sum, whether balancing is normatively justified as a matter of
first principles,3 20 the repudiation of Pike would have a substantial
impact on the judicial review of nondiscriminatory state and local reg-
ulations under the dormant Commerce Clause. Coupled with the
Court's public-entities exception, the elimination of Pike balancing
would leave instances of public protectionism entirely exempt from all
judicial review under the Commerce Clause. As a consequence, the
remedies for public protectionism would lie predominantly, if not
entirely, in the political process. That would truly mark a revolu-
tion-and a bad one at that-in the constitutional protection of the
American common market.
CONCLUSION
In our view, the Court's embrace of the New Protectionism is a
profoundly misguided and ultimately dangerous development. As the
Court sadly failed to appreciate, protectionism is protectionism,
regardless of whether the intended beneficiary is a private enterprise
or the government itself.
For that reason, we urge the Court to reappraise its embrace of
public protectionism and make clear-as it had for a century and a
half prior to United Haulers-that the Commerce Clause forbids pro-
tectionist taxes and regulations. At a bare minimum, the Court
should confine United Haulers and Davis to their facts and announce
that it will not extend its endorsement of public protectionism beyond
the particular contexts of those cases. Indeed, the Davis opinion,
which at one point emphasizes the unique circumstances confronting
318 See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 49-52 (1983).
319 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700-03 (2009) (balancing
need for criminal justice enforcement against individual's Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches).
320 Compare Denning, supra note 4, at 453-58 (arguing that Pike balancing should
be abandoned), with NORMAN R. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 42-43
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript on file with author) (arguing for retaining Pike).
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states in the municipal bond market,321 sets the stage for such a limit-
ing doctrinal move. While the Court would undoubtedly draw criti-
cism for acting in an unprincipled fashion were it to cabin its
endorsement of public protectionism in this fashion, the Court has
limited the precedential scope of its rulings in other contexts,3 22 and
the cost of acting in an allegedly unprincipled fashion is far less than
the cost to the nation of allowing public protectionism to run
rampant.
Failing that, we urge Congress to take the Court up on its invita-
tion and enact legislation to ban public protectionism. As noted
above, there are significant constitutional and practical political obsta-
cles that make it difficult for Congress to respond to particular state or
local laws (which is why we would prefer for the Court to clean up its
own mess). Nevertheless, Congress has plenary authority under the
Constitution to regulate interstate commerce, spend federal funds,
and impose income taxes. With the stakes so great, Congress should
use all the available tools at its disposal to prevent the proliferation of
public protectionism at the state and local level.
At the broadest, Congress could forbid the manufacture or sale of
goods and services in interstate commerce by state and local govern-
ments where such governments have adopted protectionist taxes or
regulations favoring such goods or services. 323 This would, in essence,
restore the status quo ante, requiring as a statutory matter the judici-
ary on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a particular state tax
or regulation is protectionist. More narrowly, Congress could make
the receipt of federal financial grants to states contingent on the states
repeal of any protectionist taxes or regulations. 324 Finally, to directly
address Davis, Congress could remove the federal tax exemption for
municipal bonds issued by states that exempt their own bonds but not
other states' bonds from state income taxation. There are other legis-
lative responses available.
321 See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1815-17 (2008).
322 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam) ("Our considera-
tion is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in
election processes generally presents many complexities."); see also Grutter v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (limiting endorsement of affirmative action in educa-
tion to twenty-five years from decision).
323 Cf United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124-26 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor
Standards Act, which prohibited manufacture of goods for interstate commerce in
violation of act). Our reference in the text to "protectionist taxes or regulations"
serves to exempt the market-participant exception from congressional prohibition.
324 Cf South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (upholding such condi-
tional grants to states).
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The exact form of the response is less important than that there
be a response. The Supreme Court's embrace of public protectionism
threatens the integrity of the American common market and does so
at a particularly precarious time economically. Sadly, the "New Pro-
tectionism" is very much like the "Old Protectionism"-the motives
behind it may be understandable, but its threat to the national econ-
omy, especially at this time of severe financial distress, is profoundly
ominous. If the Court does not act to correct its error, Congress must.
